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EXCEPTIONS TO CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
by Michael Ariens* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In August 2001, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) House of Delegates rejected two 
of three proposed amendments to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 creating exceptions to 
the duty of client confidentiality.1 The ABA’s Commission on Evaluation of Professional 
                                                 
*Professor, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. Thanks to the 
American Bar Foundation for allowing me access to its Oral History Program, including its oral 
history interview of Prof. John F. Sutton, Jr. 
1See House of Delegates Proceedings, 126:2 A.B.A. Rep. 13, 37 (2001). Technically, the 
House adopted one amendment and rejected one amendment, Prop. Model Rules Prof. Cond. 
1.6(b)(2). After it rejected Proposed Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), the Ethics 2000 Commission 
withdrew Prop. Model Rules Prof. Cond. 1.6(b)(3). Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) was amended to state: 
“to prevent reasonable certain death or substantial bodily harm.” See Report of the Commission 
on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 118:2 A.B.A. Rep. 257, 308 (2001)(quoting 
language of amendment to Model Rule 1.6(b)(1)). See generally Mark Hansen, Let the Debate 
Begin: Report on ABA ethics rules is ready for the House, ABA J., August 2001, at 80 (reporting 
“[e]xtensive debate is likely to take place over the commission’s proposed changes to Model 
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Standards (Ethics 2000 Commission) had urged the House of Delegates to permit a lawyer to 
disclose a client confidence a) “to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another 
and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services,” and b) “to 
prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that 
is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rule 1.6”); Mark Hansen, Model Rules Rehab, ABA J., October 2001, at 80 (reporting action of 
House of Delegates regarding amendments to Model Rule 1.6 at August 2001 Annual Meeting). 
The ABA publishes a record of its actions at its midyear and annual meetings. It has, for reasons 
that remain unclear to me, not published its 2003 volume. Before the amendment in adopted in 
August 2001, Model Rule 1.6 was as follows: 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the 
client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to 
carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
 (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely 
to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or  
 (2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer 
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client. 
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furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.”2 Two years later, these same 
rejected amendments to Model Rule 1.6 were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates.3 The 
ABA’s stunning turnaround concerning when client confidences may be disclosed was the 
culmination of a chaotic two-year battle among the ABA and Congress, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and even the Department of Justice (DOJ) involving efforts to 
define the role lawyers should play in protecting third parties from financial harm by a client of 
the lawyer.  
 
 This battle commenced in earnest with the collapse in Fall 2001 of Enron, followed the 
next spring and summer by the bankruptcy of several other large corporations and the indictment 
of several officers of publicly-held corporations. As these companies imploded in a wave of 
accounting scandals, the ABA attempted to head off federal regulation of the conduct of lawyers 
representing publicly-traded companies. Failing to do so, the ABA began both to appear to 
capitulate to Congress and to attempt to preserve its authority as setting the standards of 
professional conduct. In July 2002, the ABA’s Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, created 
in March, issued a preliminary report urging the ABA to reconsider its rejection in August 2001 
of the amendments to Rule 1.6. More importantly, the Task Force recommended that such 
                                                 
2See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 118:2 
A.B.A. Rep. 257, 308 (2001). See also James Podgers, The Non-Revolution, ABA J., October 
2003, at 80 (reporting adoption of amendments two years after initial rejection). 
3See James Podgers, The Non-Revolution, ABA J., October 2003, at 80.  
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disclosures of client confidences be made mandatory, not just discretionary with the lawyer.4 
The House of Delegates had in 2001 refused to amend its rules even to permit lawyers to 
disclose client confidences in such cases.  
 
 The action of the House of Delegates in August 2001 was not exceptional. Since the 
adoption of the Model Rules by the ABA in 1983, it had rejected previous efforts to expand the 
number of permissive disclosures of client confidences, and had never mandated any disclosure 
of any client confidence,5 including a confidence in which a client indicated a friend planned to 
kill a third party. This extraordinary about face by the ABA was a consequence of action by the 
Executive and, more importantly, Congress in early July 2002. On July 9, 2002, the President by 
executive order created within the DOJ a Corporate Fraud Task Force.6 Six days later, the Senate 
                                                 
4See Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility, 58 Bus. Law. 189, 206 (2002).  
5The closest the Model Rules came to mandating disclosure of a client confidence is 
found in Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) and 3.3(b), which together required a lawyer offering evidence 
before a tribunal to disclose a client confidence if a lawyer offered evidence that the lawyer later 
learned was false. At the ABA’s 2002 Midyear Meeting in February, Model Rule 3.3 was 
amended to clarify the duty of the lawyer to disclose client confidences in order to prevent any 
person from engaging in criminal or fraudulent conduct “related to the proceeding.” See House 
of Delegates Proceedings, 127:1 A.B.A. Rep. 22 (2002). See Model Rule Prof. Cond. 3.3(b) 
(2008). 
6See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002), available at 
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voted to order the SEC to adopt within 180 days rules regulating lawyer conduct, which became 
part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 enacted on July 30, 2002.7 
 
 In Fall 2002, the ABA awaited the issuance of proposed rules governing lawyer conduct 
by the SEC. In November, the SEC did so. The SEC’s final rules were issued on January 29, 
2003. When the ABA Task Force released its final report on March 31, 2003, it was able both to 
piggyback the SEC’s rules and assuage public discontent by again recommending the 
amendments to Model Rules 1.6, but now it recommended such disclosures be made permissive, 
not mandatory.8 The ABA attempted to gain the public high ground by adopting the Task Force’s 
recommendation and amending Rule 1.6 in August 2003.9 
 
 In the aftermath of the Enron bankruptcy filing on December 2, 2002, the DOJ issued the 
Thompson Memorandum in early January 2003.10 The Thompson Memorandum was a product 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/execorder.htm (last visited July 31, 2008). 
7Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (July 30, 2002), at § 307.   
8See Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 59 
Bus. Law. 145, 174 (2003). Given the charge of the Task Force, it made recommendations 
concerning other provisions of the Model Rules. 
9See Model Rules Prof. Conduct 1.6(b)(2) & 1.6(b)(3) (2008). See also James Podgers, 
The Non-Revolution, ABA J., October 2003, at 80 (reporting action of ABA adopting 
amendments).  
10Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to Heads of 
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of the Corporate Fraud Task Force and supplanted the Holder Memorandum issued by the DOJ 
in 1999.11 Both Memorandums concerned the factors evaluated before deciding whether to indict 
a corporation. The Holder Memorandum indicated that one factor in reaching a decision was 
“[t]he corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to 
cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate 
attorney-client and work product privileges.”12  The Holder Memorandum later declared that 
although “often critical in enabling the government to evaluate the completeness of a 
corporation’s voluntary disclosure and cooperation,” waiver of the privilege by a corporation 
was not “an absolute requirement, and prosecutors should consider the willingness of a 
corporation to waive the privileges when necessary to provide timely and complete information 
as only one factor in evaluating the corporation’s cooperation.”13 The Thompson Memorandum 
simply reiterated the Holder Memorandum regarding the waiver of the attorney-corporate client 
                                                                                                                                                             
Department Components, United States Attorneys re Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (last visited July 31, 2008)[hereinafter 
Thompson Memorandum].  
11Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder to All Component Heads and 
United States Attorneys re Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html (last visited July 31, 
2008)[hereinafter Holder Memorandum].  
12See id. at 3. 
13See id. at 7. 
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privilege and work product protection.14 After fending off the SEC, the ABA and the DOJ from 
2004 through 2008 battled over the meaning and interpretation the Thompson Memorandum and 
its successor, the McNulty Memorandum.15 In this second battle, the ABA charged that the DOJ 
(and other federal agencies) had eroded the attorney-corporate client privilege, thus imperiling 
fundamental rights.  As the contestants found themselves with greater or lesser power during this 
time, each adjusted its position on exceptions to client confidentiality accordingly, appearing 
attentive more to relative positions of power than concerns of policy and principle.  
 
 The purpose of this essay is to offer a pointillist history of this recent fight about when 
lawyers may or must disclose client confidences, and claims that the government was attacking 
the attorney-client privilege. In doing so, I hope to explain how this battle is representative of the 
current drift in the American legal profession.  
  
                                                 
14Section VI of both memoranda are nearly identical, other than one additional paragraph 
in the Thompson Memorandum that included as a factor “whether the corporation, while 
purporting to cooperate, has engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation ....” Thompson 
Memorandum at 6. 
15See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty to Heads of 
Department Components, United States Attorneys re Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006) available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf (last visited July 31, 
2008)[hereinafter McNulty Memorandum]. 
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 Section II traces the ABA’s often schizophrenic understanding of the duty of 
confidentiality and exceptions to that duty from the 1908 Canons of Ethics to the adoption by the 
ABA of the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility, and the re-conceptualization of that duty 
found in the adoption in 1983 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The ABA’s re-
conceptualization occurred after the discussion of the attorney-client privilege and its exceptions 
proposed by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence between 1969 and 1973. The 
consonance between the 1969 Code and the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence16 concerning the 
limits of the duty of confidentiality was shredded in the reaction to the ABA’s Discussion Draft 
of the Model Rules in January 1980. The drafts and debates concerning what became Model 
Rule 1.6 offer an initial demonstration of “playing chicken” by assorted lawyer interest groups as 
well as by the ABA, as exceptions to the duty of confidentiality became more narrowed, a 
narrowing justified by a claim that lawyers owe a nearly unfettered duty of loyalty to clients. 
Section III examines why states largely rejected Model Rule 1.6 between 1983 and the late 1990s 
and describes several corporate scandals from the late 1980s involving lawyer (mis)conduct. 
Section IV offers an instant history of the debate over when a lawyer may disclose client 
confidences in light of the Enron et al. scandals and the ABA’s charge that the federal 
                                                 
16The first draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence was published in 1969, with revised 
drafts published in 1970 and 1971. A third draft was published in 1972. See Michael Ariens, 
Progress Is Our Only Product: Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence, 17 L. & Soc. 
Inq. 213, 252 (1992). The Act adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence was signed into law by 
President Gerald Ford on January 2, 1975, and made effective July 1, 1975. See Rules of 
Evidence, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stats. 1296 (1974).  
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government was engaged in a concerted attack on the attorney-client privilege. Section V offers 
a conclusion, and an Appendix offers a timeline of the events discussed in this paper. 
 
II. UPPING THE ANTE IN THE MAKING OF THE MODEL RULES 
 
A. Beginnings 
 
 The ABA’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 32 in number, did not include a provision requiring 
lawyers to protect client confidences.  However, when the ABA adopted its Canons of Ethics, it 
also adopted an oath of admission. One of the seven oaths stated, “I will maintain the confidence 
and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client.”17  
 
 Twenty years later, the ABA supplemented its original Canons. One of the 13 Canons 
added by the ABA was Canon 37, titled “Confidences of a Client.” Canon 37 spoke less about 
the substance of the lawyer’s duty to maintain confidences or the definition of “confidences” 
than the contours of that duty. It noted that the duty extended after the client-attorney 
relationship ended, that the duty extended beyond the lawyer to the employees of the lawyer, and 
that the lawyer may not use such confidences for his private advantage. The duty to keep a 
client’s confidences did not extend to 1) “disclosing the truth” when the lawyer was falsely 
                                                 
17See Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 33 A.B.A. Rep. 567, 
585 (1908).  
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accused by his client, or 2) when the client “announced [his] intention” “to commit a crime.”18 In 
addition, Canon 41, adopted by the ABA at the same time, stated that “[w]hen a lawyer discovers 
that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a 
party, he should endeavor to rectify it.”19 
 
 The manner in which Canons 37 and  41 worked (together or separately) was unclear, and 
the extent of its application was wholly vague. The passive language in Canon 41, concerning 
the situation when “some fraud or deception has been practiced,” omitted listing the “whom” 
who had engaged in such conduct. Did the lawyer’s duty extend to fraud committed by a client, 
or merely third parties? Associated lawyers? Anyone else? Those against whom the fraudulent or 
deceptive conduct had taken place was limited by Canon 41 to “the court or a party.” Did that 
mean the lawyer had no duty to disclose a fraud against a third person not a party to the matter 
for which the lawyer served as counsel? Was “party” limited to those engaged in litigation, 
making the fraud against a person in a non-litigation context (such as a commercial transaction) 
impermissible to disclose? By stating the lawyer “should endeavor to rectify it,” Canon 41 
appeared to speak in the language of discretion, and not as a mandate (“must”) upon the lawyer. 
Was that the intended meaning of the Canon?  
 
                                                 
18See Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional 
Ethics, 53 A.B.A. Rep. 495, 497 (1928).  
19See Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional 
Ethics, 53 A.B.A. Rep. 495, 498 (1928).  
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 The interplay of Canons 37 and 41 was not assessed until 1953, when the ABA 
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances issued Formal Opinion 287. Opinion 287 
applied Canons 37 and 41 to two separate fact situations. In the first case, after a lawyer aided a 
client in obtaining a divorce, the lawyer learned that the client had lied to the court. Does a 
lawyer have a duty to rectify this past fraud upon the court? In the second fact situation, a judge 
wrongly assumes the convicted client has no past criminal record, and states so in open court. 
The criminal defense lawyer knows the judge is in error. Does the lawyer have a duty to correct 
the judge’s misapprehension? Relatedly, did the lawyer’s duty, if any, change if the judge 
specifically asked the lawyer if the convicted client has a criminal record? A divided Committee 
(4 in favor, 1 concurring and dissenting in part, and 2 dissenting) concluded that, in the first case, 
the lawyer could not disclose the lie by the divorce client to the court because the lie did not 
come within the “crime-fraud” exception to the attorney-client privilege and thus remained a 
confidence protected under Canon 37. The Committee interpreted Canon 41 as applying to a case 
such as “a civil suit, [in which] the lawyer’s client has secured an improper advantage over the 
other through fraud or deception.”20 This was not such a case. In addition, the Committee held 
that Canon 37 trumped both Canon 41 and Canon 29, titled “Upholding the Honor of the 
Profession.”21 Canon 29 stated in part: “The counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury 
has been committed owe it to the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the 
                                                 
20American Bar Association Com. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 287 (June 27, 1953), 
available at Westlaw aba-ethop database.  
21See Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 33 A.B.A. Rep. 567, 
582 (1908).  
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knowledge of the prosecuting authorities.”22 Although Canon 29 required the lawyer to disclose 
the prior perjury, this would “involve the direct violation of Canon 37,”23 and as between the 
two, Canon 37 trumped Canon 29.  
 
 In the second situation, the Committee declared that if the lawyer’s knowledge of the 
client’s past criminal record was a result of a confidential communication, Canon 37 barred 
disclosure of the record. If the lawyer’s knowledge of the client’s past criminal record was not 
due to any private communication with the client, Canon 37 was inapplicable. If Canon 37 was 
inapt, the lawyer possessed a duty of candor to the tribunal if it appeared the court “relies on him 
as corroborating the correctness of the statement” that the client had no prior record. If the court 
specifically asked the lawyer whether the client had no record, the Committee concluded the 
lawyer should “advise the court not to rely on counsel’s personal knowledge as to the facts of the 
client’s record.”24  
 
 Committee member William B. Jones believed Canon 37 applied to each of the fact 
patterns, including the case in which the lawyer learned of the client’s past criminal record 
otherwise than through a confidential communication, and so concurred in part and dissented in 
part. Dissenting committee members Wilber M. Brucker and William H. White, on the other 
                                                 
22American Bar Association, Canons of Ethics, Canon 29 (1908).  
23American Bar Association Com. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 287 (June 27, 1953).  
24American Bar Association Com. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 287 (June 27, 
1953)(dissenting opinion).  
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hand, concluded that Canons 29 and 41 require a lawyer to speak up in the circumstances of the 
presented cases, and criticized the majority opinion’s “obeisance to Canon 37.”25  
 
 Between the 1953 Formal Opinion and the adoption of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility in 1969, the ABA did not re-address the issue of the lawyer’s duty to maintain 
confidences. The ABA Special Committee on the Evaluation of Ethical Standards (“Wright 
Committee”) began drafting what became the Code in the mid-1960s. The extent of the duty to 
maintain client confidences remained unclear even during the drafting process. 
 
B. The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Federal Rules of Evidence 
 
 The Preliminary Draft of the Code of Professional Responsibility was distributed by the 
Wright Committee in October 1968 to a select group of 550, and a preliminary draft was sent on 
January 15, 1969 to approximately 20,000 persons.26 After receiving “hundreds” of comments on 
the preliminary draft, the Wright Committee made several changes and a final draft was 
presented to the ABA on July 1, 1969.27 At the ABA’s Annual Meeting in August 1969, the 
Code was adopted, effective January 1, 1970.28  
                                                 
25Id.  
26See Report of Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A. Rep. 
728 (1969). See also Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers Pro Bono 
Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 91, 118 
n.151 (2002).   
27See 94 ABA Ann. Rep. 728 (1969).  
28See House of Delegates Proceedings, 94 A.B.A. Rep. 389, 392 (1969)(adopting Code). 
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 The Code consisted of nine broad Canons. Within each Canon were Ethical 
Considerations (EC or ECs), “aspirational in character,” followed by Disciplinary Rules (DR or 
DRs), mandatory in character. Canon 4 was titled “A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences 
and Secrets of a Client.” This Canon was followed by six Ethical Considerations and one 
Disciplinary Rule. The Ethical Considerations in Canon 4 of the Code largely reiterated the 
policies promoting client confidences found in Canon 37. The lone Disciplinary Rule, 4-101, 
defined “confidence” and “secret,”29 stated the general rule of confidentiality, and ended with 
exceptions to the rule when the lawyer “may”reveal client confidences. Those exceptions were 
four in number. The exception most important to this discussion permitted the lawyer to reveal 
the “intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent a 
crime.”30 
                                                 
29The Code noted that a “confidence” was a communication protected by the attorney-
client privilege, meaning the communication between a lawyer and client was confidential and 
made for the purposes of rendering professional legal services to the client. A “secret” was 
information learned by the lawyer in the course of the representation of the client other than 
through a confidential communication. In Formal Opinion 287, the Committee implicitly 
distinguished between privileged communications (“confidences”) and information gathered by 
the lawyer other than through a confidential communication with a client (“secrets”). The Code 
protected both confidences and secrets, making no distinction between the two. 
30See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A. 
Rep. 729, 760 (1969). The language of DR 4-101(C) stated: 
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 Canon 7 expressed the duty of the lawyer to “Represent a Client Zealously Within the 
Bounds of the Law.” Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) required that a “lawyer who receives 
information clearly establishing that: (1) his client has, in the course of representation, 
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the 
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected 
person or tribunal.”31 DR 7-102(B)(1) thus rejected much of the conclusion of Formal Opinion 
287. The lawyer of the divorce client who lied to the court was prohibited from disclosing the lie 
in the Formal Opinion, but was required by DR 7-102(B)(1) to do so. DR 7-102(B)(1) was not 
included in the January 1969 preliminary draft, but was added to the July 1969 final draft of the 
Code after the Wright Committee received comments on its preliminary draft.  
                                                                                                                                                             
A lawyer may reveal:  
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but 
only after a full disclosure to them.  
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required 
by law or court order.  
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime, and the information necessary to 
prevent the crime.  
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend 
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct. 
31See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A. 
Rep. 729, 779 (1969).  
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 The language of DR 7-102(B)(1) did not fit comfortably with the language of DR 4-
101(C)(3), which permitted a lawyer to reveal a client confidence if the client intended “to 
commit a crime and the information [was] necessary to prevent a crime.”32 DR 4-101(C)(3) 
allowed disclosure of a confidence to prevent a future crime. DR 7-102(B)(1) required a lawyer 
to disclose a past (or current) fraud. These conflicting DRs were resolved in part by the ABA at 
its Midyear meeting in February 1974. It amended DR 7-102(B)(1) by adding an “excepting” 
clause at the end: “except when the information is protected as a privileged communication.”33 
As a result, if a lawyer learned of the fraud through a privileged communication (a “confidence” 
in the language of DR 4-101(A) of the Code), under the amended DR 7-102(B)(1), the lawyer 
was apparently not permitted to “reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.”34 The 
amendment did not appear to affect the exception to client confidentiality in Canon 4 permitting 
a lawyer to reveal a client confidence regarding future crimes, a category within which most 
frauds would fit.  
                                                 
32The Reporter for the Wright Committee, Prof. John F. Sutton, Jr., noted that conflict in 
a 1976 oral history interview. See Interview of John Floyd Sutton, Jr., by Olavi Maru (Dec. 20, 
1976), at 25, 28, in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History (on file with author). 
33See Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 99 
A.B.A. Rep. 262, 265 (1974). The House of Delegates approved this “housekeeping” amendment 
without debate. See id. at 166. 
34American Bar Association Com. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 341 (September 30, 1975),  
available at Westlaw aba-ethop database.  
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 The “excepting” language to the DR 7-102(B)(1) of the Code was portrayed by the 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility simply as a mere “housekeeping” 
amendment.35 But it was not. It was adopted specifically in response to the National Student 
Marketing (NSM) scandal.36 In 1969, NSM was about to merge with Interstate National 
Corporation. On October 31, 1969, the day of the merger, accountants Peat Marwick did not 
provide a signed “comfort letter.” Instead, the Peat Marwick partner in charge dictated via 
telephone an unsigned statement. NSM initially claimed a profit of about $700,000 for the first 
nine months of its fiscal year. The unsigned statement suggested three material adjustments to 
profit, which turned that profit into a loss of about $180,000. During the afternoon of the closing, 
attorneys for NSM and Peat Marwick representatives were in conversation concerning the status 
of the comfort letter and what it would state. A signed comfort letter was delivered to Interstate 
after the closing, and it included two additional statements. The first concerned an unaudited 
earnings report for nine months (an estimated loss of $80,000) and an estimation that the fiscal 
year would be a break-even year in terms of earnings. The second paragraph stated the opinion 
of Peat Marwick that “the companies should consider submitting corrected interim unaudited 
                                                 
35See House of Delegates Proceedings, 99 A.B.A. Rep. 166 (1974)(calling eight 
amendments to the Code “housekeeping” amendments). These amendments were adopted 
without debate. See id. 
36The information in this paragraph is largely taken from SEC v. National Student 
Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).  
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financial information to the shareholders prior to proceeding with the closing.”37 Neither party 
publicly disclosed the statements in the comfort letter. After sales of NSM stock by former 
Interstate shareholders and officers, NSM’s stock price collapsed. Private lawsuits were filed, 
and the SEC investigated and filed its own suit. The SEC claimed that the law firms representing 
both NSM and Interstate had a duty to disclose the fraud, and when the SEC filed suit in 1972, 
the original DR 7-102(B)(1), which required disclosure of any fraud “to the affected person,” 
was the rule. By the time the district court issued its opinion in the matter, NSM’s counsel, White 
& Case, had settled with the SEC without an admission of any liability. Interstate’s counsel, 
Lord, Bissell & Brook, remained a defendant. The court held that the lawyers “were required to 
speak out at the closing concerning the obvious materiality of the information,” and “[t]heir 
silence was not only a breach of this duty to speak, but in addition lent the appearance of 
legitimacy to the closing.”38 
 
 In 1975, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, in 
Formal Opinion 341, interpreted the 1974 “housekeeping” amendment to bar disclosure of a 
fraud by a client not only when the fraud was discovered by the lawyer through a confidential 
communication protected by the attorney-client privilege, but also when the information was, in 
                                                 
37SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 696 (D.D.C. 1978). 
38Id. at 713. White & Case settled for $1.95 million and Lord, Bissell & Brook settled for 
$1.3 million. See James M. McCauley, Corporate Responsibility and the Regulation of 
Corporate Lawyers, 3 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 15, 24 (2003). 
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the language of the Code, learned and protected as a “secret.”39 A secret was defined in the Code 
as “other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held 
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental 
to the client.”40 The “excepting” amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1) was limited by its text to a 
“privileged communication.” The amendment was thus applicable only to confidences. By 
interpreting the language of the amendment to include both confidences and secrets, Formal 
Opinion 341 thus could interpret the phrase “privileged communication” in the 1974 amendment 
to refer “to those confidences and secrets that are required to be preserved by DR 4-101.”  
 
 The consequences of this opinion did not appear to be understood by the ABA Standing 
Committee. For example, if a lawyer learned that a client was engaged in a current or future 
fraud through a confidential communication, at least two reasons existed why the 
communications was not a “privileged communication.” First, the attorney-client privilege 
protected only those confidential communications that were made for the purpose of rendering 
professional legal services. In some circumstances, such a confidential communication might not 
be protected because not made for the purpose of rendering professional legal services. 
Additionally, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege likely meant no privilege 
existed. On the other hand, a client confessing a past fraud to his attorney was a communication 
likely protected by the attorney-client privilege. When the Standing Committee interpreted the 
“excepting” language to bar a lawyer from disclosing a “secret,” the consequence was that, even 
                                                 
39American Bar Association Com. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 341 (September 30, 1975). 
40Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 4-101(A) (1969). 
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when the attorney-client privilege was inapplicable, the lawyer was not permitted to disclose the 
client’s current or future fraud if the client requested the lawyer hold that knowledge inviolate 
because disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client. It seems almost too plain 
to note that the public disclosure of any current or future fraud committed by a client would be 
either embarrassing or detrimental to the client.41 
 Formal Opinion 341 initially concluded that the 1974 amendment “reinstate[d] the 
essence of Opinion 287 which had prevailed from 1953 until 1969.”42 The reinstatement of 
Opinion 287 meant that the “tradition” (no modifier was given) was that confidences shall be 
kept “in all but the most serious cases.” The Standing Committee did not offer any case authority 
instantiating that tradition; it merely concluded that, in reconciling “the conflicting duties to 
reveal fraud and to preserve confidences,” “it is clear that there has long been an accommodation 
in favor of preserving confidences either through practice or interpretation.”43 To justify its broad 
interpretation of “privileged communication,” the Standing Committee concluded that limiting 
the phrase to communications between lawyer and client privileged under the rules of evidence 
was “undesirable because the lawyer’s ethical duty would depend upon the rules of evidence in a 
                                                 
41As Geoffrey Hazard, the reporter for the ABA Commission on Evaluation of 
Professional Standards, which drafted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, noted, Formal 
Opinion 341 also had the perverse effect of denying the lawyer the option of disclosing the fraud 
as a matter of self-defense. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and 
Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 Emory L. J. 271, 294 n.38 (1984). 
42American Bar Association Com. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 341 (September 30, 1975).  
43American Bar Association Com. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 341 (September 30, 1975).  
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particular jurisdiction.”44 This would lead to the unreasonable possibility that the lawyer would 
be put “at peril of discipline” if he had to make difficult judgments concerning the state of the 
attorney-client privilege, or, in multiple jurisdictional cases, to determine which state’s 
evidentiary privilege law applied.  
 
 The Standing Committee’s reasoning in Formal Opinion 341 is astonishingly poor even 
beyond its inability to understand the meaning of “privileged communication.” First, the 
Committee relies on a “tradition” that appears limited to a citation to Formal Opinion 287, issued 
in 1953. That opinion was not only not law, it was adopted over a strong dissent, a fact the 1975 
Committee ignores. Relatedly, a “tradition” might be found in the language of Canon 41, 
adopted by the ABA in 1928, which strongly suggested a lawyer’s duty to disclose a “fraud or 
deception” when discovered by a lawyer. Second, Formal Opinion 341 notes that DR 7-
102(B)(1) was not included in the January 1969 Preliminary Draft of the Wright Committee, and 
only added by the Wright Committee to the final draft after “[s]ome lawyers objected.” Opinion 
341 interprets this change to the final version of the Code as evidence that exceptions to the duty 
of confidentiality were “so weak that the earlier drafts of the Code of Professional Responsibility 
omitted altogether the concept embodied in Canon 41” (the precursor to DR 7-102(B)).45 As a 
matter of intention, wouldn’t an objection “by some lawyers” to the absence of an exception to 
the rule of client confidentiality in the Preliminary Draft, and a decision by the Wright 
Committee to respond to that objection by adding a provision (DR 7-102(B)) that acknowledged 
                                                 
44American Bar Association Com. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 341 (September 30, 1975).  
45American Bar Association Com. on Prof. Ethics, Formal Op. 341 (September 30, 1975).  
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an exception to the duty to keep client confidences, instead suggest a tradition allowing or even 
requiring lawyers to disclose a client’s fraud? The Committee offers no evidence that “some 
lawyers” bullied or tricked the Wright Committee into adding an exception to client confidences 
contrary to tradition, or that “some lawyers” proposing this addition represented an outlying 
minority of the legal profession. And, no matter why the Wright Committee added DR 7-102(B), 
it did so at the behest of lawyers who believed the duty of confidentiality did not include the 
situation in which the lawyer received information that the client was engaged in fraud, a fact the 
Committee too hastily dismisses. Third, Opinion 341’s focus is nearly entirely the fear of 
discipline in case the lawyer errs. It speaks little of the justifications of the duty of confidentiality 
for clients, and not at all about the social costs of a nearly impenetrable duty of confidentiality. 
That lawyers might have to interpret the law in order to decide what conduct they might or must 
engage in is required all the time of clients (that’s one value of counseling). When the law that 
must be interpreted is the law of attorney-client privilege, the objection seems even less valid, for 
lawyers with clients must constantly be aware of the extent of the privilege. In 1974, the extent 
of the privilege between attorney and corporate client was unsettled, both as it pertained to 
matters that implicated both federal and state law, and as it concerned communications that 
involved more than one state (such as telephone calls between lawyer and corporate 
representative located in two separate states, or in which two or more states claimed an interest 
in the matter).46 Thus, a lawyer in 1975 already had to make difficult judgments concerning the 
                                                 
46The Supreme Court interpreted the corporate client-lawyer privilege in Upjohn v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), rejecting the “control group” test. Even after doing so, not 
all states followed the Court’s interpretation, which meant a communication protected under 
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attorney-client privilege, and mistakes concerning the privilege might harm the client. If a lawyer 
interpreted unsettled law incorrectly, the harm of such an incorrect interpretation fell on the 
client. Why should a lawyer be shielded from any possible harm if he incorrectly applied 
unsettled law when no such shield existed for clients? The reasoning in Formal Opinion 341 is 
evidence of the lack of belief in the very system of law in which lawyers practice.  
 
 Despite the amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1)  of the Code of Professional Responsibility 
and the broad reading of that amendment in 1975 in Formal Opinion 341, the Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility in 1991 noted that “[t]he majority of states 
did not amend their codes of professional responsibility to include the 1974 amendment.”47 Two 
articles published in 1984 counted 14 or 17 states (of over 45 adopting the Code) accepting the 
amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1) as of 1983.48 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
federal law might not be protected under state law, or if more than one state’s privilege law 
applied to the communication, might be privileged in some but not all states. Federalism creates 
many problems in legal interpretation, which budding lawyers learn early in law school. 
47See Report No. 2 of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
116(2) A.B.A. Rep. 108, 111 (1991). 
48See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a 
Professional Norm, 33 Emory L.J. 271, 294 n.38 (1984)(counting 14 states); R.W. Nahstoll, The 
Lawyer’s Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality, 41 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 421, 433 
(1984)(counting 17 states).  
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 As the ABA readied itself to adopt the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, appointed by Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1965, issued its 
first draft of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence for public comment in March 1969.49 
Proposed Rule 5-03 concerned the attorney-client privilege. Section (d) of this Rule stated five 
exceptions to the privilege.50 In both the revised draft issued for public comment in March 
                                                 
49See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District 
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969). The cover letter by chairman Albert E. Jenner, 
Jr., to the Standing Committee was dated January 31, 1969.  
50The five exceptions were: 
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or 
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client 
knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or 
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant to an 
issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless of 
whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos 
transaction; or 
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an issue 
of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer; or 
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue 
concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or 
(5) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest 
between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a 
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197151 and in the final draft published in 1972,52 the Advisory Committee proposed the same 
five exceptions to the privilege without change.  
 
 As noted by the Advisory Committee’s Notes, the exceptions “in general incorporate[] 
well established exceptions” to the attorney-client privilege.53 For purposes of this essay, the first 
exception to the privilege is the most important. Proposed Rule 5-03(d)(1) excepted from the 
attorney-client privilege communications in which the client used or attempted to use the 
lawyer’s services “to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have 
known to be a crime or fraud.”54 
 
 Congress formally rejected the 13 proposed rules on privileges. It replaced those rules 
with Rule 501, which required courts to interpret privileges as “governed by the principles of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between any 
of the clients. 
See id. at 251. 
51See Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and 
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 362 (1971). 
52See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 236-37 
(1972). 
53See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 239 
(1972). 
54Prop. Fed. R. Evid. 503(d)(1), 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972).  
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common law,”55 As interpreted by federal courts since the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the “furtherance of crime or fraud” exception to the attorney-client privilege remains a 
“well established exception” to the privilege.56   
 
 In addition to the SEC’s lawsuit in the National Student Marketing matter, two events 
arising in the mid-1970s created additional stresses on the extent to which the lawyers protected 
client confidences. The first alarmed the public, even though lawyers for the most part found the 
conduct of the lawyers exceptional though not unethical. The second alarmed lawyers, for it 
suggested professionals might have duties to third parties even when clients spoke confidentially. 
 
 In 1974, upstate New York lawyers Francis Belge and Frank Armani defended Robert 
Garrow against a charge of murder.57 Garrow was charged with the brutal killing of Philip 
Domblewski, and was believed responsible for the unsolved murder of Daniel Porter, and the 
disappearance (and presumed murder) of Susan Petz  and Alicia Hauck. After Garrow’s arrest, 
his lawyers decided that Garrow’s best defense was to claim insanity. Belge and Armani began 
                                                 
55Fed. R. Evid. 501. 
56See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989)(noting issue concerns “the 
generally recognized exception to that privilege for communications in furtherance of future 
illegal conduct-the so-called ‘crime-fraud’ exception”). 
57The information in this paragraph is taken from Richard Zitrin and Carol M. Langford, 
THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER 7-26 (1999). See also New York v. Belge, 83 
Misc.2d  186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga Cty. Ct. 1975).  
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asking Garrow about Porter, Petz and Hauck, and Garrow eventually confessed. Garrow then 
gave Belge and Armani directions to the bodies of Petz and Hauck. The lawyers found the bodies 
where Garrow told them they were located, and upon doing so took photos. They did not inform 
the police or anyone else of this knowledge, including the fathers of both women. Before the trial 
began in May 1974, the bodies of Petz and Hauck were found. At the trial, Garrow testified, and 
stated that he had killed Porter, Petz and Hauck in addition to Domblewski. After Garrow 
testified, the lawyers held a press conference at which they stated they had known of Garrow’s 
involvement in the murders of Daniel Porter, Susan Petz  and Alicia Hauck since late August 
1973. Garrow was convicted.  
 
 In early 1975 Belge was indicted for violating New York Public Health law for failing to 
report to authorities the location of the bodies and for denying the murder victims a burial.58 The 
trial court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the attorney-client privilege outweighed 
the Public Health law, relying in part of the slippery slope argument of the National Association 
of Criminal Defense Counsel: “‘If this indictment stands, ‘The attorney-client privilege will be 
effectively destroyed. No defendant will be able to freely discuss the facts of his case with his 
attorney. No attorney will be able to listen to those facts without being faced with the Hobson’s 
choice of violating the law or violating his professional code of Ethics.’”59 On appeal, the trial 
court’s conclusion was upheld.60 Although the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the 
                                                 
58New York v. Belge, 83 Misc.2d  186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga Cty. Ct. 1975).  
59Id. at 187-88, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 800.  
60People v. Belge, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 1975), aff’d 359 
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indictment, it rejected an absolute claim of attorney-client privilege. The court noted, “We 
believe that an attorney must protect his client’s interests, but also must observe basic human 
standards of decency, having due regard to the need that the legal system accord justice to the 
interests of society and its individual members.”61 It reiterated the narrowness of its holding, 
declaring that it was deciding only the legal issue of the sufficiency of the indictment, and not 
deciding “the ethical questions underlying this case.”62  
 
 On July 1, 1976, the Supreme Court of California issued its opinion in Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California.63 The court held that a therapist could be held liable in 
tort for failure to warn when a patient made confidential statements to the therapist that he had 
thoughts about killing Tatiana Tarasoff, and later made good on his promise (or thoughts). The 
court noted that the California evidence code excepted from the patient-psychotherapist privilege 
confidential communications “‘if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the 
patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or 
property of another and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the 
                                                                                                                                                             
N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976). 
61Id. at 772.  
62Id. at 772. 
6317 Cal.3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). The Supreme Court of 
California initially issued its opinion on December 23, 1974. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California, 13 Cal.3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974). 
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threatened danger.’”64 It additionally noted that disclosure did not violate medical ethics: “‘A 
physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance . . . 
unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the 
welfare of the individual or of the community.’”65 Three years later, the Washington Court of 
Appeals issued its opinion in Hawkins v. King County, Department of Rehabilitative Services.66 
Michael Hawkins was represented by Richard Sanders, his attorney, at a bail hearing. The 
attorney for Hawkins’s mother and a psychiatrist both told Sanders before the hearing that 
Sanders was mentally ill. Hawkins asked Sanders to obtain his release from incarceration, and 
Sanders complied with the request. Eight days later, Hawkins assaulted his mother and then 
attempted suicide, which resulted in the amputation of both of Hawkins’s legs. Both Hawkins’s 
guardian and his mother case sued Sanders and others, invoking Tarasoff.  Although the court of 
appeals affirmed the dismissal of the tort claim against Sanders, it did so on the grounds that the 
facts of Hawkins were distinguishable from Tarasoff.67 As an legal matter, however, the court 
                                                 
64Id. at 441, 551 P.2d at 347 (quoting Evidence Code § 1024). 
65Id. at 441-42, 551 P.2d at 347 (emphasis added)(quoting § 9 of the Principles of 
Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association (1957)). 
6624 Wash. App. 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979). 
67See id. at 345, 602 P.2d at 365-66:  
In the instant case Michael Hawkins’ potential victims, his mother and sister, 
knew he might be dangerous and that he had been released from confinement, 
contrary to Tatiana Tarasoff’s ignorance of any risk of harm. Thus, no duty befell 
Sanders to warn Frances Hawkins of a risk of which she was already fully 
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appeared to accept the existence of some duty by lawyers to warn in cases similar to Tarasoff: 
“We are persuaded by the position advanced by amicus ‘that the obligation to warn, when 
confidentiality would be compromised to the client’s detriment, must be permissive at most, 
unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the client has formed a firm intention to inflict 
serious personal injuries on an unknowing third person.’”68 
 
 Within three years of its adoption by the ABA, 43 states and District of Columbia had 
adopted all or part of the Code of Professional Responsibility.69 Yet, by 1977, ABA President 
William Spann appointed the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards in 1977 to 
evaluate “all facets of legal ethics.”70 At its annual meeting in August 1977, the ABA created a 
                                                                                                                                                             
cognizant. Further, it must not be overlooked that Sanders received no 
information that Hawkins planned to assault anyone, only that he was mentally ill 
and likely to be dangerous to himself and others. That Sanders receive no 
information directly from Michael Hawkins is the final distinction between the 
two cases. 
68Id. at 344, 602 P.2d at 365. See also State v. Hansen, 122 Wash.2d 712, 721, 862 P.2d 
117, 122 (1993)(holding “attorneys, as officers of the court, have a duty to warn of true threats to 
harm members of the judiciary communicated to them by clients or by third parties”). 
69See Report of Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740, 741 (1972). 
70William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, Bar Leader, 
Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 2, 3, quoted in Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of 
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Special Committee on the Code of Professional Responsibility charged with assessing the Code 
in time for a tenth anniversary meeting in 1979.71 A year later, with the addition of three 
members, including two nonlawyer members, the Special Committee was reconstituted as the 
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (Kutak Commission) to restructure the 
rules of professional responsibility.72 One reason for the creation of the Kutak Commission, 
according to Spann, was to deal with the SEC’s interpretation of the lawyer’s duty to disclose 
confidences demonstrated in the National Student Marketing matter.73  
 
C. Drafting the Model Rules 
 
 The Kutak Commission released the Discussion Draft of its proposed Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct dated January 30, 1980. The Discussion Draft included a provision on 
confidentiality (1.7(a)) written as stating both the traditional attorney-client privilege and the 
duty of confidentiality: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Modern Legal Ethics Code, 14 Law & Soc. Inq. 677, 677 (1989). 
71See Annual Meeting Board of Governors, 102 A.B.A. Rep. 581 (1977)(creating Special 
Committee). 
72See Annual Meeting Board of Governors, 103 A.B.A. Rep. 646 (1978)(reconstituting 
Special Committee as a Commission). The Commission was chaired by Omaha lawyer Robert 
Kutak and was known as the Kutak Commission. 
73See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of Modern Legal Ethics 
Code, 14 Law & Soc. Inq. 677, 689-90 (1989). 
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In giving testimony or providing evidence concerning a client’s affairs, a lawyer 
shall not disclose information concerning a client except as authorized by the 
applicable law of evidentiary privilege. In other circumstances, a lawyer shall not 
disclose information about a client which relates to the client-lawyer relationship, 
which would embarrass the client, which is likely to be detrimental to the client, 
or which the client has requested not be disclosed, except as stated in paragraphs 
(b) and ( c).74 
 
 The remainder of 1.7 of the Discussion Draft contained two sets of exceptions from the 
stated rule. Subsection (b) of Rule 1.7 began “A lawyer shall disclose information,” indicating 
when a lawyer was required to disclose a client confidence. Subsection (b) contained two cases: 
“to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that would result 
in death or serious bodily harm to another person, and to the extent required by law or the rules 
of professional conduct.”75 
 
 Subsection 1.7(c) began “A lawyer may disclose information about a client only.” It then 
listed four instances: 
 
1) for the purpose of serving the client’s interest, unless it is information the client 
                                                 
74Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7, Discussion Draft (Jan. 30, 1980), at 21-22. 
75Id. at 22. 
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has specifically requested not be disclosed; 
2) to the extent it appears necessary to prevent or rectify the consequences of a 
deliberately wrongful act by the client, except when the lawyer have been 
employed after the commission of such an act to represent the client concerning 
the act or its consequences; 
3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between 
the lawyer and client, or to establish a defense to a civil or criminal claim or 
charge against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved; or 
4) as otherwise permitted by law or the rules of professional conduct.76 
 
 The negative reaction to proposed rule 1.7 came from both the left and right, and because 
a “working draft” of what became the Discussion Draft had been published almost six months 
earlier by the Daily Report for Executives on August 13, 1979,77 those opposed to the exceptions 
to client confidentiality had plenty of time to sharpen their critiques. The opinion page of The 
                                                 
76Id. 
77See Mark H. Aultman, Legal Fiction Becomes Legal Fantasy, 7 J. Legal Prof. 31, 39 
(1982)(noting “working draft” was “to be reviewed by a select few” but was published by “a 
newspaper or two, and appeared in the Daily Report for Executives, issued by the Bureau of 
National Affairs”). The August 2, 1979 working draft was also published in Legal Times and the 
reported in the National Law Journal. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The 
Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 Law & Soc. Inq. 677, 701 n.147 (1989). 
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Wall Street Journal titled an editorial lambasting a related proposal A License to Squeal?.78 
Monroe Freedman, a well-known proponent of a vision of lawyering that promotes (almost 
exclusively) client autonomy, including a very strong duty of client confidentiality, was also 
shown a copy of the working draft.79 Freedman leaked the working draft at the ABA’s 1979 
annual meeting.80 He then began working on an alternative code as the Reporter for the 
Commission on Professional Responsibility of The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers 
Foundation. The Public Discussion Draft of the ATLF’s American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct, 
dated June 1980, included two alternatives (named Alternative A and Alternative B) regarding 
the rule of client confidentiality and its exceptions.81 Neither permitted a lawyer to disclose a 
client confidence “to prevent or rectify the consequences of a deliberately wrongful act by the 
client.” Alternative B did not permit a lawyer to disclose a client confidence even “when the 
lawyer reasonably believes that divulgence is necessary to prevent imminent danger to human 
                                                 
78See W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules, and 
the Trial Lawyer’s Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 739, 746 
(1981), citing Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1980, at 20.  
79See Mark H. Aultman, Legal Fiction Becomes Legal Fantasy, 7 J. Legal Prof. 31, 39 
(1982). 
80See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 14 Law & Soc. Inq. 677, 702 (1989). 
81See Commission on Professional Responsibility of The Roscoe Pound-American Trial 
Lawyer’s Foundation, The American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct Public Discussion Draft-June 
1980, TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 44, 50. 
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life.”82  
 
 The Kutak Commission spent most of 1980 listening to a wide variety of comments on its 
draft. When it returned with a Proposed Final Draft, released on May 30, 1981, much had 
changed regarding client confidentiality.83 The Proposed Final Draft nearly completely re-wrote 
                                                 
82See Commission on Professional Responsibility of The Roscoe Pound-American Trial 
Lawyer’s Foundation, The American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct Public Discussion Draft-June 
1980, TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 44, 50 (quoting exception in Alternative A eliminated from 
Alternative B). 
83In the interim, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion in Upjohn v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)(released on January 13, 1981), which upheld a broad claim 
of attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine. In Upjohn, the company began 
an investigation to determine if some of its employees had violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act. Part of the investigation involved having both outside counsel and in-house counsel obtain 
information from employees, both those within the control group (high echelon executives) and 
employees from beyond the control group, concerning the actions taken by employees. A 
questionnaire was created by counsel, and employees were told to fill it out and give their answer 
to in-house counsel. The IRS demanded copies of the completed questionnaires, counsel’s notes 
and memoranda related to those questionnaires and the names of the employees with knowledge 
of the events at issue. The company declined. The Court held that the attorney-corporate client 
privilege applied to communications between in-house counsel and non-control group employees 
and found the memoranda created by counsel was protected by the work product doctrine. 
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the provision on confidentiality (and moved it to its final location as Rule 1.6). First, section (a) 
offered a terse command: “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a 
client except as stated in paragraph (b), unless the client consents after disclosure.”84 By using 
“shall,” the Kutak Commission signaled a lawyer was subject to discipline if the lawyer revealed 
information otherwise than permitted in section (b). Second, the Kutak Commission eliminated 
any occasion requiring (“shall”) a lawyer to disclose client confidences. Section (b) began, “A 
lawyer may reveal.” Third, the Proposed Final Draft eliminated all of the language used in the 
Discussion Draft concerning the attorney-client privilege in an attempt to craft a clear distinction 
between the law of privilege and the law of client confidences. Fourth, a lawyer was permitted to 
disclose a client confidence to prevent the “substantial injury to the financial interest or property 
of another.” The Discussion Draft version permitted a lawyer to “prevent ... the consequences of 
a deliberately wrongful act by the client.” Paragraph (b) listed five possible exceptions to the rule 
keeping confidences: 
 
1) to serve the client’s interests, unless it is information the client has specifically 
requested not be disclosed; 
2) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although it declined to hold opinion work product absolute, it stated “we think a far stronger 
showing of necessity and unavailability by other means than was made by the Government or 
applied by the magistrate in this case would be necessary to compel disclosure.” Id. at 401-02. 
84American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT 37 (May 30, 1981). 
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lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or 
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another; 
3) to rectify the consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act in the 
commission of which the lawyer’s services had been used; 
4) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between 
the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil 
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved; or  
5) to comply with the rules of professional conduct or other law.85 
 
 The final draft was published on June 30, 1982.86 The Kutak Commission tinkered with 
Proposed Rule 1.6 in the 1982 final draft. It eliminated the first exception by rephrasing it and 
placing it within the rule. The second exception (now proposed as the first exception) added 
“reasonably” to the state of the lawyer’s belief that death, substantial bodily harm or substantial 
injury to another’s financial interests “is likely to result.” The third exception deleted 
“commission” of the fraudulent act and replaced it with “furtherance.”87 
                                                 
85American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT 37-38 (May 30, 1981). 
86See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107 A.B.A. 
Rep. 828, 833 (1982)(reprinting as Exhibit A the Proposed Final Draft as amended through June 
30, 1982).  
87See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107 A.B.A. 
Rep. 828, 846 (1982). In addition, what was the third exception in paragraph (b) of the 1982 final 
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 The ABA sent to the Model Rules to the House of Delegates for discussion at its 1982 
Annual Meeting. The House decided its initial discussion would be limited to the black letter 
rules, and within those rules, to the “more important and controversial Rules.”88 Debate in the 
House of Delegates began with Rule 1.5 concerning fees. By the time the House had completed 
its evaluation of Rule 1.5, only a brief time was available to discuss Rule 1.6. When the allotted 
time for discussion expired, the House deferred its debate until the midyear meeting in February 
1983. As noted by Kutak Commission Reporter Geoffrey Hazard, “[t]his delay gave the 
opposition time to organize, which it did very effectively.”89  
 
 The House of Delegates re-commenced its discussion on proposed Model Rule 1.6 less 
than a month after a lengthy story in the New York Times Sunday Magazine titled Ethics and the 
Law: A Case History, about the O.P.M. Leasing Company scandal.90 By the time O.P.M. 
collapsed in early 1981, it had obtained approximately $200 million in loans based on fraudulent 
                                                                                                                                                             
draft now permitted the lawyer to disclose a confidence in response to a disciplinary complaint. 
That meant that the fourth and final exception merely stated “to comply with other law.” See id.  
88See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a 
Professional Norm, 33 Emory L. J. 271, 301 (1984).  
89See id. at 302.  
90See Stuart Taylor Jr., Ethics and the Law: A Case History, New York Times, Jan. 9, 
1983, § 6, at 31. The material is this paragraph is taken from this article. O.P.M. stood for “Other 
People’s Money,” an apt name.  
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leases. This was then the largest fraud in American history. The law firm of Singer Hutner 
handled almost all aspects of O.P.M.’s legal affairs, as well as the personal legal affairs of its 
owners, Mordecai Weissman and Myron Goodman. O.P.M. accounted for about sixty percent of 
Singer Hutner’s total income, and Singer Hutner lawyer Andrew Reinhard served as the third 
director of O.P.M. On June 12, 1980, Goodman disclosed to Joseph L. Hutner, the senior partner 
of Singer Hutner, the possibility that he had committed past wrongs on “behalf” of O.P.M.  This 
disclosure came during a meeting at Singer Hutner’s offices on the same day the firm received a 
letter from O.P.M.’s chief in-house accountant revealing the lease fraud.  Goodman somehow 
managed to take possession of the letter. Goodman later told New York Times reporter Stuart 
Taylor that this was a cover story he and Reinhard agreed to. Goodman alleged Reinhard had 
been reading the letter when Goodman took it. Once he had the letter, Goodman refused either to 
give it to the law firm or to disclose fully the “past wrongs” (fraud) unless Singer Hutner could 
promise complete confidentiality. Hutner refused to do so. After a meeting with O.P.M.’s in-
house accountant and the lawyer for the whistle-blowing accountant, it was fairly clear to the 
lawyers that O.P.M.’s survival would require additional fraudulent acts. Singer Hutner hired its 
own counsel, which advised that the firm could continue to represent O.P.M. if Goodman 
assured them the fraud had ceased. In September 1980, Singer Hutner voted to withdraw from 
representation of O.P.M. Once again following the advice of outside counsel, the firm’s 
disengagement was not immediate but gradual. This allowed both O.P.M.’s fraud to be kept 
secret and allowed Singer Hutner to collect $250,000 in fees owed it by O.P.M. and to receive a 
retainer of $250,000 for any future work required by O.P.M. When Goodman asked the law firm 
of Kaye Scholer to take over O.P.M.’s legal work, a Kaye Scholer partner, Peter Fishbein, called 
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Hutner to ask “if there was anything he should be aware of.” Hutner replied that the firm and 
O.P.M. had mutually agreed to terminate their relationship, and that “the circumstances of 
termination would not be discussed.” Kaye Scholer then represented O.P.M., allowing O.P.M. to 
obtain more than $15 million in additional loans based on fraudulent leases before the fraud was 
finally uncovered.  
 
 When the discussion turned to Model Rule 1.6 in February 1983, Reporter Geoffrey 
Hazard noted the duty of confidentiality was written more broadly in the Model Rule than in the 
Code. He also referred specifically to “the implication of the recent case involving fraud by 
O.P.M. Leasing Company for the exception relating to the prevention or rectification of financial 
or property injury.”91 An amendment to the exceptions to the duty in Model Rule 1.6(b) was 
immediately offered, and a vigorous debate ensued. The House of Delegates adopted the 
proposed amendment (207-129), leaving Model Rule 1.6(b) to read:  
 
 (b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: 
 (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer 
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or  
 (2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or 
                                                 
91See House of Delegates Proceedings Midyear Meeting, 108 A.B.A. Rep. 295-96 
(1983). 
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civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was 
involved, or to respond to the client’s allegations in any legal proceeding 
concerning the lawyer’s professional conduct for the client.92 
 
 As amended, Model Rule 1.6 prohibited a lawyer from disclosing a confidence in order to 
“prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely 
to result in ... substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another.” It also prohibited 
a lawyer from disclosing a confidence in order “to rectify the consequences of a client’s criminal 
or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer’s services had been used.”  
 
                                                 
92See House of Delegates Proceedings Midyear Meeting, 108 A.B.A. Rep. 298 (1983). A 
proposed amendment that “a lawyer shall disclose such information to the extent the lawyer 
believes necessary to prevent death or substantial bodily harm to any person” was rejected 
apparently in part because it was believed to have been implicitly rejected by the earlier 
amendment. Id. at 299. This was erroneous because amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) only 
concerned the actions of the client. The proposed amendment allowed disclosure when the 
lawyer obtained information that another person planned to harm someone (e.g., the client tells 
the lawyer, “My brother is going to make sure that witness never testifies against me,” or brother 
of client tells lawyer, “I’m going to kill the witness.”) Another proposed amendment, adding the 
words “upon appropriate notice to the client” to what became Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) was also 
defeated. See id. The ABA finally adopted a version of the “harm to another” amendment to 
Model Rule 1.6 in 2001. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 126:2 A.B.A. Rep. 13 (2001).  
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 The amendment of Model Rule 1.6 by the House of Delegates confused even high 
ranking ABA officers. President-elect designate John Shepherd gave a press conference the day 
after the ABA decided to amend proposed Model Rule 1.6. As noted by Stuart Taylor, Shepherd 
“contradicted himself repeatedly about whether ... lawyers could inform on clients who were 
committing fraud,”93 for Shepherd incorrectly understood the rule to permit though not require 
lawyers to disclose a client fraud. On the other hand, as noted by Geoffrey Hazard, some lawyers 
erroneously viewed the ABA’s decision as vindicating the actions of Singer Hutner lawyers in 
the O.P.M. matter.94  
 
 The victory achieved by opponents to the Kutak Commission’s proposal was less than 
clear. The day after the vote to amend Proposed Model Rule 1.6, the House addressed Proposed 
Model Rule 3.3, which prohibited a lawyer from offering “evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
                                                 
93Stuart Taylor Jr., Lawyers Vote for Disclosure If Needed to Correct Perjury, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 9, 1983, at A24. 
94See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a 
Professional Norm, 33 Emory L. J. 271, 306 (1984)(reporting on “good authority” that a Singer 
Hutner lawyer received calls from several lawyers after ABA amended Proposed Model Rule 1.6 
as “vindication” of actions of counsel). Despite this “vindication,” as noted by Professor Susan 
Koniak, “The law firm paid out millions of dollars to settle civil litigation brought against it for 
willfully or recklessly aiding its client’s fraud.” Error! Main Document Only.Susan P. Koniak, 
When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1236, 1262 
(2003).  
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false,” and required a lawyer who learned after the fact that he or she had offered false material 
evidence to take “reasonable remedial measures” “even if compliance requires disclosure of 
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”95 Five separate amendments to bar a lawyer from 
disclosing client perjury on the ground that this was contrary to the lawyer’s duty to keep 
confidences under Rule 1.6 were voted down.96 The House instead adopted the Kutak 
Commission proposal requiring a lawyer to disclose to the tribunal false evidence, including 
perjurious testimony of the client.  
At the completion of the Midyear Meeting, only the black letter rules had been approved. 
The Comments were subject to discussion at the Annual Meeting in August 1983, and in light of 
the changes to the Proposed Rules, several Comments needed revision. Before the meeting, 
Hazard and “interested opponents” met to reach agreement on the revised Comments.97 The 
parties agreed that the Comments would state that a lawyer was required to withdraw when the 
lawyer’s services were to be used to further a course of crime or fraud, but that after “withdrawal 
the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the clients’ confidences, except as 
                                                 
95See Report of the Drafting Committee on Proposed Mode Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 108 A.B.A. Rep. 728, 734 (1983)(quoting Rule 3.3(a)(4) and Rule 3.3(b)). 
96See House of Delegates Proceedings Midyear Meeting, 108 A.B.A. Rep. 332-39 
(1983)(quoting proposed amendments).  
97See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a 
Professional Norm, 33 Emory L. J. 271, 302 (1984)(reporting on negotiations to revise 
Comments).  
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otherwise provided in Rule 1.6.”98 Immediately following this statement was the following, 
proposed by Hazard: “Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer 
from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any 
opinion, document, affirmation or the like.”99 Thus, the lawyer was not permitted to disclose a 
confidence indicating the client had or was committing a fraud, but the lawyer was permitted to 
signal, without disclosing a confidence, the fraud by withdrawing from representation and giving 
notice of others of the fact of withdrawal. This was “noisy withdrawal,” and a sophisticated 
entity such as a bank or other institution would understand the reason for the noisy withdrawal. 
Another such victory and the Kutak Commission’s opponents were undone. 
 
 The Model Rules, including Comments, were adopted by the ABA at the Annual Meeting 
in August 1983, supplanting the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The ABA then 
began the process of convincing state authorities to adopt the Model Rules as law.  
 
III. THE MODEL RULES AS LAW, VACILLATION IN THE ABA AND CORPORATE 
SCANDALS IN THE 1980S AND 1990S 
 
A. Adopting the Model Rules as Law 
 
                                                 
98See Report of the Drafting Committee on Proposed Mode Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 108 A.B.A. Rep. 1136, 1146 (1983)(quoting Comments to Rule 1.6). 
99See id. 
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 The vast majority of states adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility within three 
years of its promulgation by the ABA.100 Only three had not considered adopting the Code by 
1972.101 The Model Rules were slower going, with just one state, New Jersey, adopting the 
Model Rules effective in 1984.102 Six or seven states adopted the Model Rules in each of the next 
three years, and nine adopted it effective in 1988, for a total of 27.103 Of the states that had 
adopted a version of the Model Rules by 1987, just three adopted Rule 1.6 without any 
amendment.104 That disparity continued through the 1990s, with just five jurisdictions of 39 
adopting Rule 1.6 without amendment by 1996.105 Although some variant of the Model Rules 
                                                 
100See Report of Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740, 741 (1972)(noting 43 states and the District of Columbia had 
adopted the Code and in four other jurisdictions Code had been approved by state bar 
associations and currently before the state supreme court). 
101See id. 
102See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes with assistance by John S. 
Dzienkowski, THE LAW OF LAWYERING Appendix B (Chronological Order) (3d ed. 2007). 
103See id. 
104Kenneth F. Krach, Note, The Client-Fraud Dilemma: A Need for Consensus, 46 Md. L. 
Rev. 436, 459 n.143 (1987)(listing three states, Delaware, Missouri, and Montana as adopting 
Rule 1.6 without amendment and listing 14 others rejecting rule in part or whole). 
105See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.,  Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of 
Legal Ethics, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 73, 93 n.88 (1997), citing NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL 
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (adding Alabama and Louisiana to list of 
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were adopted by most states by 2000, Rule 1.6 was rarely adopted without amendment. By 2002, 
41 states permitted or required (37 and four, respectively) a lawyer to disclose a confidence in 
order to prevent a client from perpetrating a fraud that constituted a crime, and 18 states (and 19 
by 2003, adding Delaware) either permitted or required a lawyer to disclose a client confidence 
to rectify a “substantial loss” to a third party resulting from a crime or fraud by the client in 
which the client used the lawyer’s services.106 Although the ABA remained the dominant 
authority on rules of legal ethics, its policy decisions were carefully assessed by the states, and in 
the case of Model Rule 1.6, it was the ABA that was the outlier, not those who believed in some 
exceptions to client confidentiality.  
 
B. The Savings & Loan Scandals and Law Firm Settlements 
 
 In early 1986, American Diversified Saving Bank (ADSB) was declared insolvent by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which then operated ADSB as conservator.107 
ADSB had used the law firm of O’Melveny & Myers to assist it in preparing private placement 
memoranda for real estate syndications. ADSB owners and officers had engaged in fraud to 
                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdictions adopting unamended Rule 1.6). 
106See Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility (July 16, 2002), 58 Bus. Law. 189, 206 nn. 39 & 40 (2002) 
107See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 
1993), rev’d and remanded, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). The facts in this paragraph are taken from the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, which noted that certain facts remained in dispute.  
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cover up ADSB’s unsound financial condition. After the FDIC took over the operations of 
ADSB, the investors in the real estate syndications complained that they had been deceived. The 
FDIC had independently made the same judgment, and offered to have the partnerships that 
controlled the investments rescind them. The investors assigned any claims they had to the 
FDIC, which in May 1989 sued O’Melveny for legal malpractice. Although dismissed by the 
district court, the Ninth Circuit reinstated the suit.  
 
 O’Melveny was not the only law firm defending itself for its work with a savings and 
loan found to be engaged in fraud. In April 1989, American Continental Corporation, the parent 
company of Lincoln Savings & Loan, declared bankruptcy.108 The law firm of Jones, Day, 
Reavis & Pogue, one of the largest in the country, began representing Lincoln in February 
1986.109 It was sued by the Resolution Trust Corporation and by private parties shortly after 
Lincoln’s failure. Its motion for summary judgment was denied in early 1992, and Jones, Day 
                                                 
108A thorough study of the rise and fall of Lincoln Savings & Loan and its de facto head, 
Charles Keating, is Michael Binstein and Charles Bowden, TRUST ME (1993). A general history 
of the savings and loan scandal is Martin Mayer, THE GREATEST EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY (paper ed. 1992). An interesting history of the 
scandal written by a regulator-turned-professor is William K. Black, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A 
BANK IS TO OWN ONE (2005). Judge Stanley Sporkin heard Lincoln’s regulatory challenge in 
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).    
109See Michael Binstein and Charles Bowden, TRUST ME 243 (1993). 
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settled in April 1993 with the government for $30.5 million in cash and $19.5 million in notes.110 
It paid an additional $24 million to settle with private plaintiffs.111 Sidley & Austin, a second 
firm hired by Lincoln, agreed to settle claims made against it by the government in late October 
1991 for $7.5 million.112 And on March 1, 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) filed a 
$275 million suit against the New York law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler for 
violating federal regulations in its representation of Lincoln. By regulatory order, OTS barred the 
firm from dissolving and its partners from leaving, and required the firm to place in escrow 25% 
of its partners’ earnings. Within a week, Kaye, Scholer settled with OTS for $41 million.113 
Kaye, Scholer also paid $20 million to private plaintiffs.114  
 
                                                 
110See Michael Binstein and Charles Bowden, TRUST ME 417 (1993). See also James O. 
Johnston, Jr. & Daniel Scott Schecter, Introduction: Kaye, Scholer and the OTS—Did Anyone 
Go Too Far?, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 977, 984 n.30 (1993). 
111Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. Mich. 
J.L. Reform 1017, 1078 n.218 (2004). 
112Id. at 1077 n.215. 
113See In re Peter M. Fishbein, 1992 WL 560945 (O.T.S.)(March 11, 1992)(requiring 
Kaye, Scholer to pay $25 million immediately and to pay remaining $16 million in four equal 
annual installments beginning in December 1993).  
114Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. Mich. 
J.L. Reform 1017, 1078 n.218 (2004). 
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 In July 1992, Washington, D.C. superlawyer Clark Clifford115 and his law partner Robert 
Altman were indicted by the federal government and by the state of New York.116 Clifford and 
Altman were embroiled in the BCCI scandal, in which the Bank of Commerce and Credit 
International was accused of money laundering, bribery,  and a host of other major and minor 
crimes. Clifford was the chairman of First American Bank, which was allegedly secretly owned 
by investors in BCCI. Clifford’s firm was also First American’s outside counsel. Clifford’s 
partner, Robert Altman was tried and acquitted, but Clifford and Altman paid $5 million to settle 
claims against them.117 
 
 By the time the savings and loan scandal was over, “[m]ore than 30 law firms [had] paid 
government claims or suit settlements over misrepresentations in financial reports for those 
institutions.”118 
                                                 
115See Joseph C. Goulden, THE SUPERLAWYERS: THE SMALL AND POWERFUL WORLD OF 
THE GREAT WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS 66-109 (1971). Clifford’s own memoir is titled COUNSEL 
TO THE PRESIDENT: A MEMOIR (1991). 
116See Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, FALSE PROFITS: THE INSIDE STORY OF BCCI, THE 
WORLD’S MOST CORRUPT EMPIRE 406-07 (1992). See also In re Clifford, No. 92-080-E-I1, 1997 
WL 829314, at *1 (F.R.B. Jan. 14, 1997). 
117See James M. McCauley, Corporate Responsibility and the Regulation of Corporate 
Lawyers, 3 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 15, 25 n.34 (2003). Clifford was not tried due to his 
declining health. He died in 1998.  
118Marianne M. Jennings, The Disconnect Between and Among Legal Ethics, Business 
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C. The ABA Standing Committee’s 1991 Effort and 1992 Response 
 
 In the midst of the savings and loan scandal, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility moved to amend Model Rule 1.6 to permit a lawyer disclose a 
client confidence “to rectify the consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act in the 
commission of which the lawyer’s services had been used.”119 This, of course, was the exact 
language used by the Kutak Commission in Proposed Model Rule 1.6(b)(3), which the ABA 
House of Delegates had rejected in 1983. The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility acknowledged this rejection, but made its recommendation because the “noisy 
withdrawal” comment to Model Rule 1.6 was insufficient. Allowing a lawyer to withdraw from 
representation and to announce that he or she was doing so did not resolve situations the 
Standing Committee viewed as “unjust and inconsistent and which threaten to unfairly subject 
lawyers to potential civil liability and criminal prosecution.”120 Although the Standing 
Committee’s initial justification for its recommendation was lawyer self-interest, its report later 
noted “[t]he public has difficulty understanding, and the profession difficulty explaining, why 
our ethical standards should require that we remain silent when third-parties are harmed as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ethics, Law, and Virtue: Learning Not to Make Ethics so Complex, 1 U. St. Thomas L.J. 995, 
1018 (2004). 
119See Report No. 2 of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
116:2 A.B.A. Rep. 108, 108 (1991).  
120See Report No. 2 of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
116:2 A.B.A. Rep. 108, 112 (1991).  
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result of our client’s misuse of our services but we ourselves are permitted to disclose client 
confidences in similar circumstances to avoid harm to ourselves.”121 A debate similar in tone and 
vigor to the 1983 debate led to a similar result, with the House of Delegates voting to reject the 
recommendation by a vote of 251-158.122 
 
 Having been rebuffed, the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
offered a reinterpretation of Model Rule 1.6 in light of Model Rules 1.2 and 1.16.123 Formal 
Opinion 92-366, issued just a year after the House of Delegates rejected the Standing 
Committee’s recommendation to amend Model Rule 1.6, was titled Withdrawal when a lawyer’s 
services will otherwise be used to perpetuate a fraud.124 As titled, the Opinion technically 
avoided the rejected recommendation made in 1991 by 1) speaking of withdrawal rather than 
formal disclosure of a client confidence and 2) speaking of current and future rather than past use 
of a lawyer’s service to commit a fraud. In a lengthy opinion, Opinion 92-366 offered four 
                                                 
121See Report No. 2 of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
116:2 A.B.A. Rep. 108, 115 (1991).  
122See House of Delegates Proceedings, 116:2 A.B.A. Rep. 16 (1991).  
123Model Rule 1.2(d) stated, in part: “A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or 
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.” Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) 
stated in part: “[A] lawyer shall ... withdraw from the representation of a client if: the 
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law.” 
124American Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 92-366 (August 8, 1992), available in Westlaw aba-
ethop database. 
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conclusions: 1) a lawyer must withdraw from representation if failure to do so would effectively 
assist in a continuing or future fraud by the client; 2) if continued representation is likely to assist 
in the fraud, a lawyer may withdraw from all representation (not just that related to the fraud) and 
must do so if the fact of representation “is likely to be known to and relied upon by third person 
to whom the continuing fraud is directed;”125 3) a lawyer may disavow any work product to 
prevent a continuing fraud even if by doing so a client confidence may inferentially be disclosed, 
and such disavowal may in some cases be required; and 4) if the fraud was in the past, and the 
lawyer did not reasonably believe the fraud would continue, the lawyer was permitted to 
withdraw but not to disavow any work product. 
 
 The Standing Committee acknowledged that the “innocent” lawyer may not disclose 
client confidences under Model Rule 1.6, but also noted that Model Rules 1.2(d) and 1.16(a)(1) 
required a lawyer to withdraw to avoid “assisting” a client in fraudulent conduct and to avoid 
violating the rules of professional conduct or other law. Thus, withdrawal was mandatory 
regarding any representation related to the fraud.  Was “noisy withdrawal” required? Yes, if 
necessary to avoid violating either Model Rules 1.2(d) or 1.16(a)(1). Noisy withdrawal did not 
violate Model Rule 1.6, for the “confidentiality requirement of Rule 1.6 should not be interpreted 
so rigidly as to prevent the lawyer from undertaking to the limited extent necessary that which is 
required to avoid a violation of Rules 1.2(e) and 1.16(a)(1).” The Standing Committee 
acknowledged its interpretation of Model Rules 1.2(d) and 1.16(a)(1) created “the collateral 
effect of inferentially revealing a confidence,” but this “implied exception” to Model Rule 1.6 
                                                 
125American Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 92-366 (August 8, 1992). 
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was necessary to clarify and reconcile “contradictory text and conflicting directives,” a 
consequence of “the ambivalence with which the legal profession has historically approached the 
problem of a client determined to engage in illegal conduct.”126  
  
 Three members of the Standing Committee dissented, arguing that the majority distorted 
the hypothetical facts, made inference upon inference concerning the lawyer’s work product and 
its use by a third party, and quoted Lewis Carroll in attacking the majority’s interpretation of the 
text of the Model Rules.127 The dissent concluded by noting that the Standing Committee’s 
authority was to interpret the Rules adopted by the House of Delegates, not “to torture the plain 
meaning and obvious intent of the Rules reflected in their language and legislative history as to 
supply by interpretation a result clearly and repeatedly rejected in enactment.”128 Just as the 
Standing Committee could fairly be attacked in its effort to broaden the duty of client 
confidentiality in 1975 in Formal Opinion 341, so too could the Standing Committee in 1992 be 
fairly attacked in its efforts to allow lawyers to communicate their client’s fraud without formally 
disclosing a client confidence. In each instance, the Standing Committee interpreted clear 
                                                 
126American Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 92-366 (August 8, 1992). 
127American Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 92-366 (August 8, 1992)(dissenting opinion). The 
dissent quoted from ALICE IN WONDERLAND: “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in 
rather a scornful tone ‘it means just what I choose it to mean— neither more nor less.’ ‘The 
question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’” See id. 
128American Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 92-366 (August 8, 1992)(dissenting opinion). 
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language to suit its policy views. Not only was the ABA out of step with most states on 
confidentiality, its Standing Committee was out of step with its House of Delegates. 
 
 The Standing Committee made one additional half-hearted effort to reform Model Rule 
1.6 when discussing in 1993 its recommendation to add a choice of law provision to the Model 
Rules.129 It again justified its recommendation in large part based on lawyer self-interest. The 
Standing Committee noted, “The most compelling circumstance of a lawyer caught between 
conflicting ethical obligations in all likelihood is that where a lawyer has become aware of a 
client’s fraud committed in the course of the lawyer’s representation, and the rule of one 
jurisdiction with authority over the lawyer would require disclosure of the fraud and that of 
another jurisdiction with authority would forbid it.”130 The same year, the Committee on 
Professional Responsibility of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York published its 
Report on the Debate over Whether there should be an Exception to Confidentiality for 
Rectifying a Crime or Fraud.131 After retracing some of the history noted above, a majority of 
the Committee supported a rule of disclosure, and “[t]he entire Committee agrees that the present 
state of the ethical rules governing lawyers’ conduct provides little guidance to the practitioner; 
                                                 
129See Report No. 2 of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
118:2 A.B.A. Rep. 112 (1993).  
130See id. at 116.  
13120 Fordham Urb. L.J. 857 (1993).  
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the rules are confusing and contradictory, and therefore, at the very least, these rules should be 
clarified to provide more meaningful guidance.”132  
 
 Beginning in 1997, the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission assessed the Model Rules. The 
proposals were readied in time for the ABA’s annual meeting in August 2001. 
IV. PLAYING CHICKEN 
 
A. The Fall of Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the ABA’s Efforts to Combat Federal Regulation of 
Lawyer Conduct 
 
 By the time the ABA began discussing the Ethics 2000 Commission’s proposed changes 
to the Model Rules, the American Law Institute had finally adopted (in 2000) its Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. Section 67 of the Restatement was titled Using or 
Disclosing Information to Prevent, Rectify, or Mitigate Substantial Financial Loss. It permitted a 
lawyer to disclose a client confidence to prevent a crime or fraud when the lawyer believed it 
reasonably necessary to do so, as long as the loss was “substantial,” had not yet occurred, was to 
be committed by the lawyer’s client or by the client acting through a third party, and the lawyer’s 
services were implicated in the crime or fraud. In addition, § 67(2) declared that if the fraud had 
already occurred, the lawyer was permitted to disclose a client confidence as necessary to 
                                                 
132Report on the Debate over Whether there should be an Exception to Confidentiality for 
Rectifying a Crime or Fraud, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 857, 870 (1993). That majority disagreed 
about whether the rule on rectifying client fraud should be permissive or mandatory. See id. at 
877. 
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mitigate, prevent or rectify any loss. Its in comment (b) to § 67, the ALI indicated that over 40 
jurisdictions had departed from the rule adopted in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, but 
also indicated that the “issues addressed in this Section are variously treated in American 
jurisdictions.”133  
 
 Although not a member of the ALI Committee on the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, Geoffrey Hazard was the executive director of the ALI during its discussion of the 
Restatement. Hazard was a member of the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission, and the proposals of 
Ethics 2000 on Model Rule 1.6 reflected in major part his proposals as Reporter for the Kutak 
Commission that framed the Model Rules. 
 
 As noted in the Introduction, the ABA House of Delegates rejected the two Ethics 2000 
proposals permitting disclosure of client confidences: 1) “to prevent the client from committing a 
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s 
services,” and 2) “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s 
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s 
services.”134 
                                                 
133See American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS cmt. b (2000), in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, 
2008-2009 EDITION 782 (John S. Dzienkowski ed. 2008).  
134See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
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 One week after the House of Delegates debate, Enron publicly announced the resignation 
of Jeffrey Skilling as CEO. Skilling had been on the job for just six months, and the stated 
justification for his decision was family reasons.135 Two months later, on October 16, Enron 
announced a $1.01 billion restatement of its earnings. On December 2, Enron, having publicly 
restated its earnings again for the years 1997-2001, filed for bankruptcy. Congress began 
hearings in January 2002. At the end of the month, Global Crossing filed for bankruptcy, at the 
time the seventh largest bankruptcy in American history. On February 14, Congressman Michael 
Oxley introduced a bill to regulate accounting firms.  
 
 While Congress considered what to do, 40 law professors sent a letter to SEC Chairman 
Harvey Pitt on March 7, 2002, urging a rule that lawyers should be required by the SEC to go to 
the corporate client’s board of directors to disclose any current or proposed future illegal conduct 
“that senior management refused to rectify.”136 On March 28, SEC General Counsel David 
                                                                                                                                                             
118:2 A.B.A. Rep. 257, 308 (2001).  
135Kurt Eichanwald’s book CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS (2005) offers some evidence that 
Skilling was concerned about his relationships with his children when he resigned, but also notes 
the vagueness in Skilling’s statements to Kenneth Lay, the Board of Directors and his colleagues 
of the timing and basis of his resignation. See id. at 473-85. Some of the facts concerning Enron 
are also found in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).  
136See Letter of Richard W. Painter to Harvey Pitt, March 7, 2002, at 1, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/pitt.pdf (last visited July 31, 2008).  
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Becker replied, noting that the SEC had not attempted to regulate the professional conduct of 
lawyers practicing before it since 1981, and the “strong view among the bar that these matters 
are more appropriately addressed by state bar rules ....”137 On the same day, in what appeared to 
be an effort to head off greater federal regulation of lawyers, ABA President Robert Hirshon 
created a Task Force on Corporate Responsibility.  
 
 In late April, WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers resigned. In early June, Tyco CEO Dennis 
Kozlowski resigned under pressure and was indicted by New York for tax avoidance. This ever-
widening scandal began to outrun a Congress in a hurry to create a “remedy.” 
 
 On June 18, 2002, North Carolina Senator John Edwards sent a letter to Pitt referencing 
the March 7 letter of law professors, and offering the opinion that a lawyer who knew of 
violations of securities laws “should have an obligation to inform the board of these violations.138 
Edwards continued, “in view of the uncertainty surrounding current ABA and state rules,” this 
                                                 
137See Letter of David Becker to Richard W. Painter, March 28, 2002, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/becker.pdf (last visited July 31, 2008). 
The SEC had considered regulating the conduct of lawyers in In re Carter & Johnson, No. 3-
5464, 1981 WL 314179 (SEC Feb. 28, 1981), but rejected the ALJ’s suspension in that case. 
After the ABA objected to the SEC’s claim of authority to regulate lawyers, the SEC did little 
concerning lawyer conduct before the SEC. 
138See Letter of Sen. John Edwards to Harvey Pitt, June 18, 2002, 148 Cong. Rec. S5652.  
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duty of lawyers should be federally mandated.139 Edwards’s remarks in the Senate on the same 
day criticized corporate lawyers and noted, “The American Bar Association ought to take a 
leading role here, something they have not done thus far.”140 Three days earlier, the accounting 
and consulting firm of Arthur Andersen had been convicted in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas on one count of obstructing justice related to its work for 
Enron.141 The day before Edwards sent his letter to Pitt, Tyco filed a civil suit against its former 
Chief Corporate Counsel, Mark Belnick. 
 
 On June 25, 2002, Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland introduced legislation 
that eventually became Sarbanes-Oxley. That bill contained no language concerning lawyers. On 
the same day, WorldCom publicly disclosed a $3.8 billion restatement of its EBITDA (Earnings 
Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization), and cable and communications company 
Adelphia filed for bankruptcy. On July 9, the President announced the creation of a Corporate 
Fraud Task Force, and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson was named its chair. 
 
                                                 
139See id. 
140148 Cong. Rec. S5652 (June 18, 2002). Edwards sent a copy of this letter to the ABA, 
which responded on June 20, 2002. ABA President Robert Hirshon disagreed with Senator 
Edwards, but noted that he had appointed a Task Force to look at the ethical rules governing 
lawyers. See Letter from Robert E. Hirshon to Senator John Edwards, June 20, 2002, available at  
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/107th/business062002.html (last visited July 31, 2008). 
141See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).  
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 On July 10, Senator Edwards proposed an amendment to the Sarbanes bill, which became 
§ 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Edwards amendment required the SEC to adopt rules 
“setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing 
before the Commission in any way in the representation of public companies ...”142 within 180 
days of the bill’s enactment. On July 15, 2002, the Senate adopted the amendment unanimously, 
97-0, and the Sarbanes bill was adopted by the same vote that day.143  
 
 The next day, the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility issued its Preliminary 
Report.144 The Preliminary Report recommended amending Model Rule 1.13 to require the 
lawyer to go to a higher authority in the corporation “where the misconduct by a corporate 
officer, employee or agent involves crime or fraud, including violations of federal securities laws 
and regulations.”145 This reporting “up” the corporate ladder was ostensibly the only requirement 
                                                 
142148 Cong. Rec. S6559 (July 10, 2002). 
143Id. at S6778-79 (July 15, 2002). 
144See Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility, 58 Bus. Law. 189 (2002)(released July 16, 2002). 
145See id. at 204. Ethics 2000 recommended only a “reasonably belief” change to Model 
Rule 1.13. See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
126:2 A.B.A. Rep. 257, 370 (2001). The ABA adopted this recommendation at its Midyear 
Meeting in February 2002. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 127:1 A.B.A. Rep. 18 (2002). 
The Task Force’s recommendation amending Model Rule 1.13 to allow reporting up and the 
possibility of reporting out was adopted by the ABA at its Annual Meeting in August 2003. See 
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of the Edwards amendment to the Sarbanes bill. As noted in the packaged “debate” concerning 
the Edwards amendment, Senator Sarbanes asked Senator Edwards, “It is my understanding that 
this amendment, which places responsibility upon the lawyer for the corporation to report up the 
ladder, only involves going up within the corporate structure. He doesn’t go outside of the 
corporate structure. So the lawyer would first go to the chief legal officer, or the chief executive 
officer, and if he didn’t get an appropriate response, he would go to the board of directors. Is that 
correct?”146 Senator Edwards replied, “[T]he only obligation that this amendment creates is the 
obligation to report to the client, which begins with the chief legal officer, and, if that is 
unsuccessful, then to the board of the corporation. There is no obligation to report anything 
outside the client-the corporation.”147 
 
 Even though the Edwards amendment was limited, the Preliminary Report of the Task 
Force went beyond the requirements of the Edwards amendment. The Task Force also 
recommended the adoption of the two amendments to Model Rule 1.6 rejected 11 months earlier 
by the ABA. It did so with a twist. The Task Force recommended that Model Rule 1.6 be 
amended “to make disclosure mandatory.”148 Not only did this go beyond the recommendation of 
Ethics 2000, it largely went beyond the state of the law of professional conduct in most states. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Model Rule Prof. Cond. 1.13 (2008). 
146148 Cong. Rec. S6557 (July 10, 2002). 
147See id. 
148See Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility, 58 Bus. Law. 189, 206 (2002). 
  
62 
Although the Task Force noted that “Forty-one states either permit or require disclosure to 
prevent a client from perpetuating a fraud that constitutes a crime, and eighteen states permit or 
require disclosure to rectify substantial loss resulting from client crime or fraud in which the 
client used the lawyer’s services,”149 the Task Force left to the footnotes the information that just  
four states require disclosure in the first instance and just three states required disclosure in the 
second instance.150 An additional justification for making disclosure necessary was the “public 
demand that lawyers play a greater role in promoting corporate responsibility” was “almost 
certainly much stronger” than public sentiment of a year earlier.151  
 
 This recommendation of the Task Force was striking, a bold effort challenging the vision 
of lawyering that placed client interests ahead of the interests of third parties in nearly all 
circumstances (as long as the “third parties” were not the lawyers themselves). Although § 67 of 
the ALI’s Restatement departed from the ABA’s Model Rule 1.6, it merely permitted and did not 
require disclosure. The 1993 report of the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York had also concluded an exception to the rule of 
confidentiality to rectify client crime or fraud should exist, but its members did not reach 
agreement on whether such disclosure be made permissible or mandatory. This recommendation 
of mandatory disclosure appeared to indicate the seriousness of the ABA’s response to the raft of 
corporate scandals since late 2001. 
                                                 
149Id. 
150See id. at 206 nn.39-40 (listing jurisdictions). 
151Id. at 207. 
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 The difficulty with accepting the Task Force’s proposals at face value (or at least the 
impact of those proposals on the ABA as an entity) is several fold. The timing of the issuance of 
the Preliminary Report, as well as its recommendation that disclosure of client confidences in 
fraud matters be made mandatory, suggests less a principled change of direction than a 
calculated effort to engage in last-minute politicking to eliminate the Edwards amendment.152 
                                                 
152Accord Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contribution, in 
the Effort to Improve Corporate Lawyers’ Professional Conduct, 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 16 
(2003)(“One hesitates to ascribe motives, but in the context, the urgent tone of the Preliminary 
Report appears in part to have been an effort to sidetrack the Edwards Amendment in the 
Conference Committee process by showing that the ABA had gotten the message”). For an 
example of the ABA’s lobbying at this time, see Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, 
Governmental Affairs Office, ABA to Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, July 19, 2002  available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/107th/business071902.html (last visited July 31, 
2008)(opposing § 307). 
 In a June 20, 2002 letter from ABA President Robert Hirshon to Senator Edwards, 
Hirshon indicated the Preliminary Report was to be delivered at the ABA’s Annual Meeting in 
August. See Letter from Robert E. Hirshon to Senator John Edwards, June 20, 2002, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/107th/business062002.html (last visited July 31, 2008). 
Releasing the Preliminary Report nearly a month early and during the fight over the Edwards 
amendment suggests the Report was intended more for Congress than the membership of the 
ABA. 
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Second, as will be discussed in more detail below, the ABA’s public comments after the SEC in 
November 2002 issued its proposed rules regulating lawyer conduct calculatedly ignore the Task 
Force recommendation, a recommendation no longer necessary once the SEC decided not to 
mandate but merely permit such disclosures. Third, the Final Report of the Task Force, issued on 
March 31, 2003, fails to explain why it now recommended permissible but not mandatory 
disclosures of client confidences to prevent, mitigate or rectify client frauds causing substantial 
harm to third persons. 
 
 In terms of last minute politicking, the ABA’s efforts were bound to fail given the 
metastisizing of the accounting (and possibly legal) scandals since the fall of Enron. Even before 
the introduction by Senator Sarbanes of his bill, the bankruptcy of Global Crossing, the 
resignations of WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers, Adelphia CEO and Chairman of the Board John 
                                                                                                                                                             
 At this time everyone was getting on board. On August 1, 2002, two days after the 
President signed Sarbanes-Oxley into law, the Conference of Chief Justices resolved that Model 
Rule 1.6 be amended as recommended by the Ethics 2000 Commission. See Conference of Chief 
Justices, Resolution 35: In Support of Rule 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) of Ethics 2000 (Aug. 1, 
2002), at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/resol35RuleOneptSixEthics2000.html (last visited July 31, 2008). 
Why state chief justices would care what ABA Model Rule 1.6 stated is unclear, for most states 
had already voiced their disagreement with the ABA’s position. It appears the Chief Justices 
were more interested in protecting their lawyer regulation turf, and getting the ABA to relent on 
Model Rule 1.6 was perceived as providing an opportunity for the SEC to lessen its vigor in 
promulgating rules of professional conduct. 
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Rigas and Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski, and the conviction of Arthur Andersen demanded (by 
Congress’s own lights) that it do something. On July 21, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy, the 
largest ever. Three days later former Adelphia CEO John Rigas was sued by SEC for fraud. That 
same day, July 24, the Conference Committee reached agreement on Sarbanes-Oxley, including 
§ 307. The Act was inevitable, and the likelihood that the bill would be amended in Conference 
to excuse lawyers from regulatory oversight was minuscule, for it was contrary to the popular 
and populist anger at large corporations, the executives who profited from them, and their 
perceived aiders and abettors. No better sense of the inevitability of the bill was its popularity in 
both Houses with both parties. The bill passed in the House on July 25 by a vote of 423-3 and in 
the Senate by a vote of 99-0.153 
 
 The SEC had until the end of January 2003 to issue its rules regulating the conduct of 
lawyers pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley. On November 21, 2002, shortly after the midterm elections 
and the resignation on November 5 by Harvey Pitt from the chairmanship of the SEC,154 the 
Commission issued its Proposed Rules.155 Paragraph (e)(2) of the Proposed Rules stated: 
                                                 
153See 148 Cong. Rec. H5480 (July 25, 2002)(423-3, with 8 abstaining); 148 Cong. Rec. 
S7365 (July 25, 2002)(one member absent). The bill was signed into law on July 30, 2002. See 
Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat 745. 
154See Letter from Harvey Pitt to President George W. Bush, November 5, 2002, at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/regulation/2002-11-05-pitt-resignation-letter_x.htm 
(last visited July 31, 2008).  
155See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, December 2, 
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An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation 
of an issuer may reveal to the Commission, without the issuer’s consent, 
confidential information related to the representation to the extent the attorney 
reasonably believes necessary: 
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing an illegal act that the attorney 
reasonably believes is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interest 
or property of the issuer or investors;  
(ii) To prevent the issuer from committing an illegal act that the attorney 
reasonably believes is likely to perpetuate a fraud upon the Commission; or 
(iii) To rectify the consequences of the issuer’s illegal act in the furtherance of 
which the attorney’s services had been used.156 
                                                                                                                                                             
2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670 (Dec. 2, 2002). The date of the Proposed Standards is November 21, 
2002. 
156See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, November 21, 
2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71692 (Dec. 2, 2002). The Final Rule, § 205.3(d)(2), differed very 
slightly from the proposal. It stated:  
(d) Issuer confidences. 
(1) Any report under this section (or the contemporaneous record thereof) or any 
response thereto (or the contemporaneous record thereof) may be used by an 
attorney in connection with any investigation, proceeding, or litigation in which 
the attorney’s compliance with this part is in issue. 
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 As noted by the SEC, its proposed paragraph (e)(2) was essentially the proposed Model 
Rule 1.6 of both the Kutak Commission and the Ethics 2000 Commission, both rejected by the 
ABA House of Delegates. The SEC’s proposed paragraph (e)(2) made disclosure of client 
confidences permissive, not mandatory. The SEC noted that a few states made such disclosures 
mandatory, and further noted the Preliminary Report of the ABA Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility made the same recommendation in amending Model Rule 1.6. However, the SEC 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in the 
representation of an issuer may reveal to the Commission, without the issuer’s 
consent, confidential information related to the representation to the extent the 
attorney reasonably believes necessary: 
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely to 
cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or 
investors; 
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative 
proceeding from committing perjury, proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1621; suborning 
perjury, proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1622; or committing any act proscribed in 18 
U.S.C. 1001 that is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or 
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that caused, 
or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer 
or investors in the furtherance of which the attorney's services were used. 
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (2008). 
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concluded that mandatory disclosure did not appear necessary because “[t]he ‘noisy withdrawal’ 
provision in Section 205.3(d) probably makes permissive disclosure of confidential information 
under the circumstances of Section 205.3(e) sufficient to protect investors.”157 Noisy withdrawal 
had specifically been permitted when Professor Hazard, as Reporter for the Kutak Commission, 
and other parties negotiated the comments to the Model Rules in 1983. Comment 15 to Model 
Rule 1.6 stated in part: “Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer 
from giving notice of the fact of the withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm 
any opinion, document, disaffirmation, or the like.”158 The difference between comment 15 to 
Model Rule 1.6 and the Proposed Rules of the SEC was the latter made noisy withdrawal 
mandatory in cases when a lawyer had reported evidence of a material violation to a 
representative of the corporate client, but had received neither a response nor an appropriate 
response, and the violation was ongoing and likely to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests of a third party.159 Thus, even if a lawyer chose not to disclose a client confidence, as 
was permitted under the SEC’s Proposed Rules, a lawyer was required in some circumstances to 
                                                 
157See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, November 21, 
2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71693 (Dec. 2, 2002). Noisy withdrawal, in Proposed Section 
205.3(d), required public disaffirmance of previous opinions and withdrawal from 
representation, similar to then-existing cmt. 15 to Model Rule 1.6 and Model Rules 1.13 on 
entity representation and 1.16 on required withdrawal from representation. 
158See Model Rule Prof. Cond. 1.6 cmt. 15 (2001).  
159See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, November 21, 
2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71688-89 (Dec. 2, 2002)(stating Proposed Rule 205.3(d)(1)).  
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withdraw from representation, and do so “noisily,” thus sending a signal to third persons to be 
alert in engaging in any transaction with the lawyer’s former client. 
 
 The ABA’s initial response to the SEC’s Proposed Rules was sent by letter dated 
December 18, 2002.160 It noted the Proposed Rules affected a number of Model Rules. With 
particular reference to Model Rule 1.6, the ABA limited itself initially to the statement that the 
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility was assessing whether to recommend amendments to 
that Rule.161 It made no mention of the recommendation in the Preliminary Report of the Task 
Force that disclosures related to client fraud be mandatory. Indeed, in discussing the duties of a 
lawyer fired from representation to disclose a “material violation,” the ABA opposed any 
“mandatory” duty of the discharged lawyer to “report up,” that is, to disclose that evidence to the 
board. It also opposed any duty to “report out,” that is, to report evidence of material violations 
to the SEC.162 
 
 When discussing whether an exception to the duty of confidentiality should exist for 
client (or issuer) financial fraud, the December 18, 2002 letter simply misled the reader about the 
Task Force’s Preliminary Report recommendations. The ABA noted that “many jurisdictions 
                                                 
160See Letter of Alfred P. Carlton, Jr. to Securities and Exchange Commission, December 
18, 2002, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL410000pub/comments/20021218000000.pdf (last 
visited July 31, 2008). 
161See id. at 9. 
162See id. at 24. 
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permit disclosure of client confidences to the extent necessary to prevent, mitigate or rectify the 
consequences of a client crime or fraud ....”163 It then declared that the Task Force “in its 
preliminary report has recommended that the Association again consider the ABA Ethics 2000 
Commission’s proposals to amend the Model Rules to allow similar disclosures.”164 But the 
Preliminary Report of the Task Force had not simply urged a reconsideration of the Ethics 2000 
proposals; it recommended those proposals on disclosing client confidences be made mandatory, 
which Ethics 2000 had not recommended. 
 
 The ABA had taken advantage of the SEC’s decision to make disclosure of client 
confidences permissive rather than mandatory. The Preliminary Report recommendations of the 
Task Force that 1) Model Rule 1.6 be amended and 2) exceptions to the duty of confidentiality 
be made mandatory were offered when the ABA was battling against the adoption of § 307. 
Once the SEC issued its Proposed Rules and proposed making disclosures of client confidences 
permissive, not mandatory, any need to propose mandatory disclosures had disappeared. Seeing 
an opening, the ABA’s response to the Proposed Rules focused in part on perceived threats to the 
attorney-client privilege, noting that noisy withdrawal and disclosure of confidences might 
constitute a waiver of the privilege.165 The ABA correctly noted that a declaration by the SEC 
that noisy withdrawal and limited disclosure of client confidences was not a waiver of the 
privilege might not be respected by the courts. Consequently, the ABA urged the SEC to wait 
                                                 
163See id. at 25 (emphasis in original). 
164See id. at 26. 
165See id. at 32. 
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until receiving express congressional authorization before writing rules on noisy withdrawal, 
disaffirmation of work product and exceptions to confidentiality.166 Waiting for congressional 
approval, of course, greatly lessened any chance the SEC would embrace a role in guiding 
lawyer conduct, for Congress had already expressed its bipartisan “outrage,” and had no need to 
return to that issue. Urging the SEC to wait for congressional permission gave the ABA time to 
reassert the notion that lawyers were best regulated internally. 
 
 When the SEC issued its Final Rules on Lawyer Conduct on January 29, 2003,167 it 
eliminated its “noisy withdrawal” proposals, but invited further comment on that issue.168 It kept 
                                                 
166See id. at 33. 
167Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (Final Rule), 
January 29, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 6926 (Feb. 6, 2003), codified at 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (2008).  
168See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (Final Rule), 
January 29, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6297 (Feb. 6, 2003). The SEC invited comments on a 
Proposed Rule § 205.3(e)(1), which would have required the issuer to give notice to the SEC of 
an attorney’s withdrawal from representation, but this proposal was eliminated from the Final 
Rules implemented in August 2003. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys (Proposed Rule), January 29, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6329 (Feb. 6, 2003)(citing 
proposed “noisy withdrawal” provision requiring issuer but not attorney to provide notice of 
attorney withdrawal). Proposed Rule 205.3(d)(1) in the November 21, 2002 Proposed Rules 
required a noisy withdrawal, but, as the SEC noted, “Paragraph (d)(1), however, does not require 
even an outside attorney retained by the issuer to disclose evidence of the reported material 
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as permissive the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.169 The problem created by the 
deletion of the noisy withdrawal provisions was that the SEC’s stated basis for making the 
exceptions to confidentiality permissive rather than mandatory was that the mandatory “‘noisy 
withdrawal’ provision in Section 205.3(d) probably makes permissive disclosure of confidential 
information ... sufficient to protect investors.”170 The SEC offered no explanation why 
exceptions to client confidences should remain permissive after eliminating any “noisy 
withdrawal” provision, including any mandatory noisy withdrawal. Nor did the SEC cite the 
Preliminary Report of the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility in its Final Rule, as it 
had in its November 21, 2002 release. 
 The constituent parts of the ABA took full advantage of its opportunity to take the 
offensive. The Final Report of the ABA Task Force was completed on March 31, 2003.171 It 
triumphantly declared, “The Model Rules’ treatment of the lawyer’s obligation of confidentiality 
                                                                                                                                                             
violation, only to make a ‘noisy withdrawal.’” See Implementation of Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorney (Proposed Rule), November 21, 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71689 (Dec. 2, 
2002). On noisy withdrawal and the SEC, see generally Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen 
and Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 Vill. L. 
Rev. 725 (2004). 
169See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2008). 
170See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, November 21, 
2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71693 (Dec. 2, 2002) 
171See Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 
59 Bus. Law. 145, 172-74 (2003)(dated March 31, 2003).  
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is significantly out of step with the policy balance reflected in the rules of professional conduct 
in most of the states, in Section 67 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, 
and in the recommendations of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct (‘Ethics 2000 Commission’).”172 The Task Force then urged the ABA to reconsider the 
Ethics 2000 recommendations amending Model Rule 1.6. Of course, Ethics 2000 recommended 
permissive disclosure, which the Preliminary Report of the Task Force had rejected. In its Final 
Report, the Task Force made no mention why it no longer supported mandatory disclosure of 
client confidences in cases involving client fraud. It was as if that recommendation had never 
existed. This switch, along with an absence of reasoning explaining this shift, strongly suggests it 
never intended for its initial recommendations to become the ABA’s “official” position.   
 
 On April 2, 2003, the ABA sent a letter to the SEC with additional comments concerning 
“noisy withdrawal” and other measures upon which comment was invited. The letter noted the 
Preliminary Report of the Task Force, and reminded the SEC the Task Force was given the 
charge to “propose changes in the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”173 
Interestingly, though the Final Report was dated Monday, March 31, the letter sent by the ABA 
on Wednesday, April 2 did not mention the Final Report. This allowed the ABA to avoid 
explaining why the Task Force had changed its mind regarding the amendments to Model Rule 
                                                 
172Id. at 172. 
173See Letter of Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., to SEC, April 2, 2003, at 2, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL410000pub/comments/20030402000000.pdf (cite 
for April 2, 2003 letter of ABA to SEC) 
  
74 
1.6.  The ABA letter indicated that it would provide the SEC a copy of the Final Report when 
available. The letter also expressed the ABA’s continued objection to “noisy withdrawal.” The 
SEC has made no further changes to its Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
 In August 2003, the ABA did what it had to, though just 52% of the delegates agreed to  
amend Model Rule 1.6.174 Despite the fact that this issue had been debated on and off within the 
ABA for nearly a quarter-century, and despite the fact that the ABA’s position was clearly a 
minority position, and despite the fact that the House of Delegates barely passed these 
amendments, the ABA Journal titled its report on this decision as “The Non-Revolution.”175  
 
 Having successfully managed to avoid overarching federal regulation of the conduct of 
lawyers through SEC regulations, the ABA in mid-2004 began its efforts challenging the DOJ’s 
                                                 
174See Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen and Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical 
Duties of Lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 725, 732 n.33 (2004)(noting vote to 
amend Rule 1.6 was 218-201). The House of Delegates agreed to amend Model Rule 1.13 as 
well, by a similarly close vote. See id. 
175See James Podgers, The Non-Revolution, ABA J., October 2003, at 80. The 
amendments to the black letter rules were not the only changes made by the House of Delegates. 
The comments to the Model Rules were also amended. Comment 15 to Model Rule 1.6, which 
provided for noisy withdrawal, was deleted. Instead, the ABA added the following statement to 
Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.1: “Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of 
the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like.” See Model 
Rule Prof. Cond. 4.1 cmt. 3 (2008).  
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use of waiver of the attorney-client privilege in determining whether to request an indictment of 
a corporation.  
 
B. The DOJ and Waiver of the Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege 
 
 In 1999, the Department of Justice issued the Holder Memorandum.176 The Holder 
Memorandum set forth a list of eight factors to aid prosecutors in determining whether to indict a 
corporation. The fourth factor was “[t]he corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if 
necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product privileges.”177Although 
the Holder Memorandum noted that the factors were not “outcome-determinative and are only 
guidelines,” the Holder Memorandum was influential for federal prosecutors making charging 
decisions regarding corporations, which traditionally had not been indicted.  
 
 On January 20, 2003, the Department of Justice issued the Thompson Memorandum,178 
named after Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson. Thompson was the chair of the 
Corporate Fraud Task Force and was responsible for the investigation of Enron after Attorney 
                                                 
176Holder Memorandum, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html (last visited July 31, 
2008).  
177Id. at 3. Technically, it is the work product doctrine, ordinarily related to discovery in 
civil cases, and not a privilege. The Thompson Memorandum corrected this error. 
178Thompson Memorandum, available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (last visited July 31, 2008).  
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General John Ashcroft recused himself on conflict of interest grounds.179 The Thompson 
Memorandum replaced the Holder Memorandum, although it kept nearly all of the former’s 
factors and considerations.180 The fourth factor listed in the Holder memorandum, which 
concerned the effect of cooperation, including waiver of the attorney-client privilege, was 
repeated nearly verbatim in the Thompson Memorandum.181 The explanation of this factor in the 
Thompson Memorandum largely mirrors the justifications made in the Holder Memorandum. 
Section VI of both Memorandums states that the extent of the corporation’s cooperation may be 
gauged by looking at a corporation’s willingness to identify the culprits, make witnesses 
available, “to disclose the complete results of its internal investigation; and to waive attorney-
client and work product protection.”182 The justification for waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege and work product protection concerned the “completeness” of the disclosure, for 
                                                 
179See Kurt Eichenwald, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS 648-49 (2005)(noting Ashcroft’s recusal 
and assignment of duties to Thompson). 
180The Holder Memorandum consisted of eight factors while the Thompson 
Memorandum consisted of nine factors. The first six factors were nearly identical. The remaining 
three factors in the Thompson Memorandum merely stated more clearly and fully the last two 
factors of the Holder Memorandum. Compare Holder Memorandum at 3-4 with Thompson 
Memorandum at 2-3 (listing factors). 
181The Thompson Memorandum corrected the language of “work product privilege” by 
referring to “the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection.” See 
Thompson Memorandum at 3.  
182Id. at 5. 
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“[s]uch waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and 
targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements” and “they 
are often critical in enabling the government to evaluate the completeness of a corporation’s 
voluntary disclosure and cooperation.”183 Prosecutors could request the corporation waive the 
privilege, but the DOJ did not “consider waiver of a corporation’s attorney-client and work 
product protection an absolute requirement, and prosecutors should consider the willingness of a 
corporation to waive such protection when necessary to provide timely and complete information 
as only one factor in evaluating the corporation’s cooperation.”184 Finally, footnote 3 to the 
Thompson memorandum states, “Except in unusual circumstances, prosecutors should not seek a 
waiver with respect to communications and work product related to advice concerning the 
government’s criminal investigation.”185 The most important difference between the Holder 
Memorandum and the Thompson memorandum was that the latter was binding on all federal 
prosecutors.186 
 
                                                 
183Id. This language is taken directly from the Holder Memorandum. See Holder 
Memorandum at 7. 
184Thompson Memorandum at 5. This language is modified only slightly from the Holder 
Memorandum, which collapsed the distinction between attorney-client privilege and the work 
product doctrine. See Holder Memorandum at 13 n.2. 
185Thompson Memorandum at 10 n.3. This language is taken directly from the Holder 
Memorandum. See Holder Memorandum at 13 n.2. 
186See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp.2d 330, 338 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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 Although the Thompson Memorandum largely echoed the factors and policy 
justifications listed in the Holder Memorandum, it was issued on the heels of the astonishing 
bankruptcies of Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom and Adelphia, the indictment of former 
officers at Tyco and the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. As a consequence, the Thompson 
Memorandum began making its way to the forefront of many lawyers’ minds. It did not do so 
immediately, however. The ABA did not take notice of the Thompson Memorandum until late 
2004 over 18 months after it was issued, and over five years after its nearly identical predecessor 
(in terms of waiver of the privilege and work product protection) was adopted by the DOJ. 
 
 One year after the DOJ issued the Thompson Memorandum, the United States Sentencing 
Commission proposed adding a reference in the Commentary to Sentencing Guideline § 8C2.5 
stating, “Waiver of attorney-client privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite 
to a reduction in culpability score ... unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide timely 
and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organization.”187 This proposal 
followed the approach taken in the Holder and Thompson Memorandums regarding the purpose 
and impact of any waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The additional Commentary was to be 
added in November 2004. 
 
 In August 2004, the ABA House of Delegates adopted Recommendation 303 which, 
among other objections, requested the Sentencing Commission amend its Commentary to state 
that waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine “should not be a factor in 
                                                 
187See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § 8C2.5 
Commentary to Note 12 (2004), withdrawn effective November 1, 2006. 
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determining whether a sentencing reduction is warranted for cooperation with the 
government.”188 Recommendation 303 did not challenge the Thompson Memorandum. In 
September 2004, ABA President Robert Grey appointed a Task Force on Attorney-Client 
Privilege. The Task Force returned with a report eight months later in May 2005.189 The Task 
Force recommended adoption of three combined resolutions, the first supporting the attorney-
client privilege, the second opposing its erosion, and the third opposing “the routine practice by 
government officials of seeking to obtain a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work 
product doctrine through the granting or denial of any benefit or advantage.”190 As resolutions 
go, it was hard to disagree with. Even the Thompson Memorandum noted that waiver of the 
privilege and work product was not mandatory if a corporation wished to avoid indictment. 
                                                 
188See Report of the Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, at 1 n.1 (August 2006), 
available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneycleitn/materials/hod/emprights_report_adopted.pdf (last 
visited July 31, 2008)(quoting part of Recommendation 303 adopted at Annual Meeting in 
August 2004). 
189See Report of the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 60 Bus. Law. 1029 (2005). 
190See Recommendation 111, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/recommendation_adopted.pdf (last 
visited July 31, 2008). This Recommendation was adopted at the Annual Meeting in August 
2005. 
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Requiring waiver of the privilege as a “routine practice” was the antithesis of the discretion 
required of prosecutors investigating corporate malfeasance under the Thompson Memorandum. 
 
 The Task Force ominously declared that it had “heard from a variety of sources that, 
whether made overtly or implicitly, these requests [for waiver], backed by an express or implied 
threat of harsh treatment for refusing, have become increasingly common.”191 If true, this was a 
damning indictment of the government. As the largest organization of lawyers in the world, 
surely the ABA had the duty to do more than adopt several uninspiring resolutions. 
Unfortunately, the ABA’s evidence consisted of no citations to any specific event or case. 
Instead, the Task Force cited two other reports, one from the Association of Corporate Counsel 
(formerly the American Corporate Counsel Association), a group of in-house lawyers, and the 
other written on behalf of the ABA Criminal Justice Section. Both reports pitched their 
accusations at a high level of generality, offering nothing in the way of specific abuses of power 
by prosecutors or others. It was certainly possible that the agents of the government were abusing 
their prosecutorial powers, but the evidence was lacking.  
 
 The ABA Task Force’s criticism of the Thompson Memorandum also failed to note that 
the language concerning waiver of the attorney-client privilege was taken nearly verbatim from 
the Holder Memorandum of 1999. It implied that the Thompson Memorandum had been a direct 
response to President Bush’s call “after the collapse of Enron for more vigorous prosecutions of 
                                                 
191See Report of the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 60 Bus. Law. 1029, 1044 (2005). 
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corporations.”192 The Task Force further criticized the DOJ for failing to issue internal guidelines 
“interpreting the purpose of this policy, when it is to be applied and what safeguards should be in 
place to prevent abuse at the local level.”193 
 
 The other target of the Task Force was the SEC, which it criticized for its 2001 Seaboard 
Report.194 The Seaboard Report chose not to take action against a parent company for an 
employee’s accounting fraud involving a subsidiary, and listed “some of the criteria we will 
consider in determining whether, and how much, to credit self-policing, self-reporting, 
remediation and cooperation—from the extraordinary step of taking no enforcement action to 
bringing reduced charges, seeking lighter sanctions, or including mitigating language in 
documents we use to announce and resolve enforcement actions.”195 The Report listed 13 
criteria, many of which included more than one question for consideration. Criterion 11 asked a 
number of questions, ending with “Did the company voluntarily disclose information our staff 
did not directly request and otherwise might not have uncovered? Did the company ask its 
employees to cooperate with our staff and make all reasonable efforts to secure such 
                                                 
192Id. 
193Id. at 1045. 
194See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement 
Decisions, Exch. Act Rel. No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm (last visited July 31, 2008). 
195See id. 
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cooperation?”196 After this final question the SEC included footnote 3, which stated in part, “In 
some cases, the desire to provide information to the Commission staff may cause companies to 
consider choosing not to assert the attorney-client privilege, the work product protection and 
other privileges, protections and exemptions with respect to the Commission.”197 
 One curiosity with the criticism of the SEC’s Seaboard Report by the Task Force on 
Attorney-Client Privilege was the length of time it took for the ABA to level it. The Seaboard 
Report was released on October 23, 2001. It took nearly four years for the ABA, or at least its 
                                                 
196Id. 
197See id. at n.3. The remainder of footnote 3 stated: 
 
The Commission recognizes that these privileges, protections and exemptions 
serve important social interests. In this regard, the Commission does not view a 
company's waiver of a privilege as an end in itself, but only as a means (where 
necessary) to provide relevant and sometimes critical information to the 
Commission staff. Thus, the Commission recently filed an amicus brief arguing 
that the provision of privileged information to the Commission staff pursuant to a 
confidentiality agreement did not necessarily waive the privilege as to third 
parties. Brief of SEC as Amicus Curiae, McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99-C-7980-3 
(Ga. Ct. App. Filed May 13, 2001). Moreover, in certain circumstances, the 
Commission staff has agreed that a witness’ production of privileged information 
would not constitute a subject matter waiver that would entitle the staff to receive 
further privileged information.  
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Task Force, to voice its discontent with the Seaboard Report’s consideration of a company’s 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege as helpful in the SEC’s determination regarding whether 
to file charges.198 Of course, in October 2001, the September 11 attacks remained fresh in 
American memory, and Enron was beginning its rapid descent, which began the perceived 
assault on the ABA’s Model Rules. Now, two years after the implementation of the very modest 
lawyer conduct rules by the SEC, the ABA was emboldened to attack what was now a four-year 
old policy. 
 
 The Commentary to note 12 of § 8C2.5 of the Sentencing Guidelines concerning the 
effect of waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product did not last. After demands by the 
ABA and threats by Congress, on April 5, 2006, the Sentencing Commission agreed to delete the 
Commentary as of November 1, 2006 over the objection of the DOJ.199 This Commentary was in 
                                                 
198Official ABA policy is set by its House of Delegates. Consequently, the 
Recommendations adopted by the ABA are official policy. Reports of bodies such as the Task 
Force do not constitute official ABA policy unless adopted by the ABA. 
199See Terry Carter, Privilege Waiver Policy Dumped, 5 No. 15 ABA J. E-Report 2 (April 
14, 2006). The Sentencing Guidelines were also subject to scrutiny in the Supreme Court at this 
time. In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), released on January 12, 2005, the Court 
held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were subject to the jury trial requirement of the Sixth 
Amendment, requiring the proof of any fact used to determine a defendant’s sentence, and held 
that the Sentencing Guidelines were no longer mandatory. Booker followed the Court’s decision 
the previous Term in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which held that the increase 
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effect for just two years. 
 
 A bigger victory for those opposed to the perceived inroads on the attorney-corporate 
client privilege occurred two months later. On June 26, 2006, the Southern District of New York 
held the provision in the Thompson Memorandum that stated that payment of an employee’s 
attorney fees would be considered a lack of cooperation on part of employer when considering 
whether to indict the corporate employer was unconstitutional, because it violated the substantive 
due process rights of employees as well as their right to counsel.200 Stein did appear to be a case 
of government overreaching, and now the ABA and others had an example of coercive tactics by 
the government undermining the rights and liberties of its citizenry. The Stein case humanized 
the ABA’s growing attack on the Thompson Memorandum. Holder and Thompson listed factors 
that aided a prosecutor in determining whether to charge a corporation with a crime. Before 
Stein, the ABA’s arguments against the Thompson Memorandum were “internal” arguments of 
policy, hard to sell to the public. Now the ABA could charge the Thompson Memorandum with 
infringing on the constitutional rights of a human being, and the hard sell became that much 
easier. With great timing, the ABA had, on May 2, 2006, less than two months before the Stein 
opinion was released, formally requested Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to amend the 
Thompson Memorandum.201 
                                                                                                                                                             
in a defendant’s sentence in state court based on a finding that the defendant acted with 
deliberate cruelty, a fact not adduced at the trial, violated the Sixth Amendment. 
200United States v. Stein, 435 F.Supp.2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
201See Report of the Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, August 2006, at 2, 
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 When the ABA met in August 2006, the latest Task Force report majestically concluded 
that the Thompson Memorandum “as well as similar practices instituted by civil enforcement 
authorities, have contributed to an erosion of these individual rights.”202 An attack on individual 
rights gave the impression that the federal government was hounding human beings, not just the 
legal persons corporations were in law. Further, because cooperation by an organization often 
began before any person was criminally charged, “the manner in which the Thompson 
Memorandum has at times been implemented conflicts with the most basic American legal 
principle that defendants (and potential defendants) are innocent until proven guilty.”203 In 
addition to Stein, the ABA Task Force claimed evidence of the government’s assault on 
individual rights was found in a “detailed survey, containing responses from over 1,200 in-house 
and outside corporate counsel.”204  One claim made by counsel responding to the questions in the 
survey205 was that the government had created a “culture of waiver,” in which it expected 
corporations to waive the privilege to show cooperation. One great difficulty with using this 
survey as evidence of the infamy of the Thompson Memorandum is its wholly non-scientific 
character. The survey was “open” for two weeks to partners of the ABA’s Task Force on 
                                                                                                                                                             
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/emprights_adopted.pdf 
(last visited July 31, 2008).  
202Id. at 3 (emphasis added).  
203Id. at 16. 
204Id. at 6 n.18. 
205The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, March 2006, 
http://www.acc.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf (last visited July 31, 2008). 
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Attorney-Client Privilege, to members of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
the Business Law and Criminal Law sections of the ABA, and members of the Association of 
Corporate Counsel, among others. Self-selected (not randomly selected) members of that group 
filled in the web-based survey.206 The goal of the coalition conducting this survey was to 
persuade the Sentencing Commission to eliminate its Commentary to § 8C2.5 adopted in 2004. 
(It was later that this survey was used to attack the Thompson Memorandum.) A self-interested 
group surveyed (in a very broad sense) self-interested members of that group to determine 
whether those members were troubled by a government policy they were already committed to 
overturning. How could anyone take the results of this survey seriously? Or present it as 
evidence of a failed governmental policy? It would have taken a miracle for the survey to 
indicate that a governmental “culture of waiver” did not exist, given both the goal of the survey 
and the composition of the respondents to the survey.  
 
 On September 5, 2006, a number of “former senior Justice Department officials” wrote to 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales indicating agreement with the ABA and concluding that “the 
Thompson Memorandum is seriously flawed and undermines, rather than enhances, compliance 
with the law.”207 These officials urged amending the Thompson Memorandum to “state 
                                                 
206Id. at 2-3 n.7 (noting to whom survey sent and how responses were generated). 
207See Letter from Griffin B. Bell et al. to the Honorable Alberto Gonzales, September 5, 
2006, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2007jul30_privwaiv_frmrdojb_l.pdf 
(including 2006 letter as attachment to July 30, 2007 letter from Stuart Gerson to the Honorable 
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affirmatively that waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product protections should not be 
a factor in determining whether an organization has cooperated with the government in an 
investigation.”208 The naked appeal to authority (“former senior Justice Department officials”) 
excused the ABA from adducing real evidence of the perversity of the Thompson Memorandum, 
which, after all, had largely adopted the language of the Holder Memorandum from 1999. 
 
 Despite the slender evidence supporting its attacks on the Thompson Memorandum, the 
ABA Task Force had several things going for it in mid-2006. First, the memory of the corporate 
scandals was fast fading.209 Second, traditional American distrust of government made palatable 
the claim that the government was unfairly seeking corporate convictions.210 Third, members of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Patrick Leahy et al.) (last visited July 31, 2008). 
208Id. 
209I believe this is the case even though it wasn’t until May 25, 2006 that Enron’s former 
chairman Kenneth Lay and former CEO Jeffrey Skilling were convicted.  
210For example, by August 2006, the Supreme Court had issued three opinions 
concerning the federal government’s detention of alleged terrorists and had in several respects 
roundly criticized the government’s justifications. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004)(holding American citizen has due process right to fair hearing as enemy combatant); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)(holding aliens held by government at naval base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, could bring suits contesting legality and conditions of confinement); 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)(holding adoption by Congress of the Detainee 
Treatment Act did not deprive Court of jurisdiction to hear cases involving enemy combatants).  
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Congress perceived an opportunity to make political hay to “protect” the embattled attorney-
client privilege from governmental abuses in a mid-term election year.211 The Senate Judiciary 
Committee held a hearing in September 2006 “on the Justice Department’s cooperation standards 
and the effect these standards have on the right to counsel.”212 
 The November 2006 midterm elections, like most for the party holding executive office, 
were disastrous. The Democratic Party took control of both Houses. On December 7, 2006, 
during the lame duck congressional session, Republican Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter, the 
outgoing Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, informally introduced a bill to protect the 
attorney-client privilege, called the “Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006.”213 This 
                                                 
211This political rush began even before 2006. See, e.g., Remarks of F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, at “Erosion of the Attorney-
Client Privilege: What Does the Future Hold?”, November 16, 2005, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/acprivsensenbrenner11-16-05.pdf (last visited July 31, 
2008)(lauding attorney-client privilege and noting DOJ no longer conditioning waiver as a 
condition for receiving departure from Sentencing Guidelines). Senator Arlen Specter, then the 
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, also made a speech to the United States Chamber 
of Commerce that day at the same Conference. 
212See ABA Urges Support for Attorney-Client Privilege Legislation, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/200707/article09.html (last visited July 31, 2008). 
213See 152 Cong. Rec. S11438-39 (Dec. 7, 2006). A copy of the bill is also found at 
http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/acppa06.pdf (last visited July 31, 2008). See also 
http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/200612/article01.html (reporting introduction of bill on 
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bill would bar federal prosecutors from demanding or requesting, directly or indirectly, that 
companies waive the attorney-client privilege or work product protections during an 
investigation, or use as a factor any voluntary waiver in determining whether to charge the 
assertion of the privilege.214 It allowed any organization to make a “voluntary and unsolicited 
offer to share the internal investigation materials of the organization.”215 Despite the saber-
rattling, it appears that Senator Specter’s purpose was to find an issue (“prosecutorial abuse” of 
the “fundamental” attorney-client privilege) to spotlight as he moved from Chairman to Ranking 
Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, not to push legislation through Congress.  
 And Specter’s bill was exactly what the ABA Task Force demanded. Less than a week 
later, the DOJ scrapped the Thompson Memorandum, replacing it with the McNulty 
Memorandum. The “Factors to be Considered” in the McNulty Memorandum differed in only 
                                                                                                                                                             
December 7, 2006) (last visited July 31, 2008). 
214See 152 Cong. Rec. S11439 (Dec. 7, 2006) (reprinting bill). See also  
http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/acppa06.pdfId at 5-6 (last visited July 31, 2008). The bill did 
not state what if any consequences resulted if a prosecutor was found (one must assume a federal 
court made such a finding under some claim of prosecutorial abuse) to have violated its 
provisions. Was it dismissal of any indictment with prejudice? A Congressional directive to the 
executive to fire the government agent? The bill possesses serious separation of powers 
problems, for it involved congressional regulation of the executive’s “exclusive authority and 
absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
693 (1974).  
215Id. at 6. 
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one substantive respect from the Thompson Memorandum: Factor 4 of the McNulty 
Memorandum noted “the company’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its 
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents.”216 It deleted from the Thompson 
Memorandum the remainder of Factor 4: “including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate 
attorney-client and work product protection.”217 Section VII of the McNulty Memorandum 
included in subsection (2) a discussion of waiver of the attorney-corporate client privilege and 
the work product doctrine. The McNulty Memorandum permitted a government attorney to 
request a waiver if there existed a “legitimate need,” which was defined as: 
 
(1) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit the 
government’s investigation;  
(2) whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and complete 
fashion by using alternative means that do not require waiver; 
(3) the completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided; and  
(4) the collateral consequences to a corporation of a waiver.218 
 
 The McNulty Memorandum divided waivers into two types, Category I and Category II. 
Category I waivers involved “purely factual information,”219 some of which would not be 
                                                 
216Id. at 4. Cf. Thompson Memorandum at 3. 
217See Thompson Memorandum at 3. 
218See McNulty Memorandum at 9. 
219See id.  
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privileged. Even before seeking purely factual information, the United States Attorney was 
required to consult with the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. Both the 
request and any authorization by the United States Attorney for a Category I waiver was to be in 
writing. Category II information, which clearly required a waiver of the privilege or 
relinquishment of the protections of the work product doctrine, “should only be sought in rare 
circumstances” and only if the information gathered from a Category I request was insufficient to 
ensure a thorough investigation.220 Category II information could be sought only after the Deputy 
Attorney General provided written authorization allowing the government to seek a waiver. An 
organization’s decision to refuse to waive its protections in Category II matters could not be used 
in making a charging decision, although a voluntary acquiescence could be considered favorably 
by prosecutors.221 What did not meet the ABA’s demands or the Specter bill’s requirements was 
the McNulty Memorandum’s use of a corporation’s decision with regard to a Category I request: 
“A corporation’s response to the government’s request for waiver of privilege for Category I 
information may be considered in determining whether a corporation has cooperated in the 
government’s investigation.”222  
 
 Specter filed the same bill in the new Congress on January 4, 2007.223 After hearings in 
                                                 
220See id. at 10. 
221See id. 
222See id. at 9. 
223S. 183, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2007jan04_privwaiv_s186.pdf (last 
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the House in March and in the Senate in September, a companion bill in the House passed in 
November 2007.224 As congressional pressure on the DOJ increased, the ABA raised the stakes. 
In a 16-page statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee during a hearing in September 2007,225 
the ABA counted the many ways in which the McNulty Memorandum was flawed.226 It again 
raised Stein and the unscientific survey of in-house counsel alleging a “culture of waiver” as 
evidence of the need for the adoption of the Specter bill. It offered as “new” evidence a letter 
                                                                                                                                                             
visited July 31, 2008). 
224H.R. 3013 was passed by the House on November 13, 2007. See 153 Cong. Rec. 
H13564 (Nov. 13, 2007). The bill is found at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2007nov13_hr3013_billtext.pdf (last 
visited July 31, 2008). See also http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/ 
(reporting passage of bill in House) (last visited July 31, 2008). 
225This followed a similar 17-page statement from ABA President Karen J. Mathis to a 
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee at a hearing on March 8, 2007. See Statement of 
Karen J. Mathis Concerning “The McNulty Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in 
Corporate Investigations”, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2007mar08_privwaivh_t.pdf (last visited July 31, 
2008). 
226See Statement of the American Bar Association to the Committee on Judiciary of the 
United States Senate, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/20070918_mcnulty.pdf (last visited July 
31, 2008).  
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from Norman Veasey, the former chair of the Ethics 2000 Commission.227 The Veasey letter 
offered 12 “anecdotal” experiences of varying relevance, with Veasey himself acting as a 
“neutral” who had not “independently verified the accuracy of the underlying facts.”228 Veasey 
did not explain why his letter, reporting rank hearsay concerning allegations about which he had 
no firsthand knowledge, should be persuasive. Not only had Veasey not verified the truth of 
these 12 claims of alleged prosecutorial abuse, those making claims of prosecutorial abuse hid 
under the cloak of anonymity, for fear of “reprisals, and that public disclosure of these stories 
could further erode their clients’ ongoing relationships with prosecutors or enforcement officials 
with whom they must continue to work.”229 Again, if government agents were truly that evil, 
engaging in retaliation upon innocents when their abuse of power was unmasked by lawyers for 
those innocents, weren’t lawyers duty-bound to make a principled stand by “speaking truth to 
power”? Anonymous claims of prosecutorial abuses allowed lawyers to play both sides of the 
street, cozying up to prosecutors when it fit their clients’ needs, and cozying up to legislators 
when that best protected their clients’ interests. For the ABA to rely on the anonymous claims 
                                                 
227See Letter from Norman Veasey to Senate Judiciary Committee, September 13, 2007, 
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/cjveaseyletter.pdf (last 
visited July 31, 2008).  
228See id. at 3. 
229See id. If that’s the case, then why speak at all? For example, Veasey’s Case No. 9 
noted that Judge T.S. Ellis III had ruled in the case, see Veasey Letter at 10, evidence specific 
enough for anyone to learn the identities of the non-profit corporation and government attorney 
involved in that matter. 
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made in the Veasey letter as evidence of prosecutorial abuse suggests the worst type of witch 
hunt. It was cowardly. Finally, six of the 12 anecdotal cases noted by Veasey were pre-McNulty 
cases, while only three arose after the McNulty Memorandum was issued (three began before 
McNulty and continued after McNulty was issued). How evidence of six cases involving a 
protocol no longer in effect was relevant to the operation of the McNulty Memorandum was not 
discussed by Veasey. Of the three arising after adoption of the McNulty Memorandum, one 
allegedly concerned prosecutorial overreaching, with the company “sticking to its guns” and 
refusing to waive to no apparent ill effect, the second claimed a “more subtle, but nonetheless 
palpable [sic]” pressure, and the third seemed based on company speculation of abusive 
prosecutorial motives designed to lessen the benefit given the company for self-reporting an EPA 
violation.230 Veasey provided a numerator, 12, but failed to provide a denominator (was this 12 
of 20 possible cases? 12 of 200 possible cases?), meaning the reader had no sense of the extent 
of the “problem” of prosecutorial abuse. Like the self-interested survey of in-house (and other 
interested) counsel claiming the government had instituted a “culture of waiver,” the evidence 
produced in the Veasey letter was fraught was evidentiary problems. It proved nothing but a 
desire for the ABA to appeal to the passion of the legislature. After all, “horror” stories of 
overzealous prosecutors (unnamed and unknown, but out there somewhere) were much more 
valuable to the legislative process than mere reason.  
 
 In November 2007, in a letter to all members of the House, which was readying a vote on 
the House version of the Specter bill, the ABA declared the McNulty Memorandum “pressures 
                                                 
230See id. at 4-6. 
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companies and other organizations to waive their privileges as a condition for receiving 
cooperation credit, and hence leniency, during investigations.”231 No evidence was offered to 
prove this claim, but none was needed. Of course corporations needed congressional protection; 
they cowered under the threat of prosecution from just about any governmental agent. But the 
attorney-corporate client privilege doesn’t sell that well to most people. Thus, the ABA letter 
quickly turned (as had the Task Force) from pressure on corporations to claiming the McNulty 
Memorandum attacked individuals and individual rights. In addition to pressuring corporations, 
the McNulty Memorandum incorporated policies that “violate employees’ Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel and Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by pressuring companies 
to not pay their employees’ legal fees during investigations, to fire the employees for not waiving 
their rights, or to take other punitive actions against them long before any guilt has been 
established.”232 Stein was a fecund source for the ABA. Framing the McNulty Memorandum as 
inimical to individual rights allows the ABA to promote its opposition to the McNulty 
Memorandum in a way that minimizes the benefits a change will bring to corporations. 
 
 The Specter bill has been reintroduced in 2008, and, the ABA notes, the DOJ is expected 
                                                 
231See Letter from William H. Neukom, ABA President to “Dear Representative,” 
November 7, 2007, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2007nov8_hr3013h_l.pdf (last visited July 31, 
2008).  
232Id. at 1. 
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to alter or replace the McNulty Memorandum soon.233 But now that the ABA is wholly on the 
offensive, even replacing the McNulty Memorandum is not enough, for “the new policy will not 
solve the larger problem of government-coerced waiver because it would not affect the similar 
waiver policies adopted by the SEC, the EPA, HUD, and numerous other agencies.”234 The 
Enron scandal isn’t just history, it’s ancient, irrelevant history. That is, until the next corporate 
fraud crisis. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
  
 The extent to which the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to a client bars the disclosure of client 
confidences reflects a philosophical dispute concerning the role of the lawyer in a democratic 
society. Whether a lawyer may disclose a client confidence to rectify a past fraud, or disclose a 
client confidence to prevent a future fraud if the lawyer’s services are not used to assist in the 
commission of the fraud present difficult questions. So too is the question whether the disclosure 
of client confidences by a lawyer should be made mandatory or permissive in specific 
circumstances. Thus, the dissonance within the ABA about how to resolve these issues since the 
                                                 
233See Independence of the Legal Profession: Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product, 
and Employee Legal Protections, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/ (last visited July 31, 2008). See also 
Marcia Coyle, ‘McNulty Memo’ Triggers an Ultimatum, Nat’l L.J., July 7, 2008, at 6 (noting 
status of proposed bill).  
234See id. 
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early 1950s speaks in great part to the truth that such issues present jurisprudential dilemmas.  
 
 Even the rejection of the Kutak Commission’s proposed Model Rule 1.6 may be 
understood largely as a jurisprudential debate, although the debate lacked clarity, and some of 
the debaters seemed less concerned about policy and principle and more concerned about power. 
But the ABA’s actions since its adoption of the Model Rules in 1983 on the issue of client 
confidentiality appear almost wholly based on preservation of its authority to speak on behalf of 
lawyers and to speak to lawyers. The rejection of the Ethics 2000 Commission’s amendments to 
Model Rule 1.6 possessed more than a whiff of arrogance. When the ABA had to go on the 
defensive shortly thereafter due to the collapse of Enron, its Task Force on Corporate (not 
Lawyer) Responsibility proposed sweeping changes, changes that gave the appearance of acting 
in the public interest, but clearly offered in a focused effort to squelch congressional 
authorization to SEC of a power to regulate lawyer conduct. When that failed, the ABA managed 
to protect the system of lawyer self-regulation through a strategic retreat that left the SEC’s 
regulations of lawyer conduct largely toothless, and put the ABA in a position in which self- and 
client-interest was trumpeted as public interest. Regaining the offensive, the ABA clothed in the 
garb of protecting individual rights its attacks on DOJ policy allowing its prosecutors to consider 
waiver of attorney-client privilege in determining whether to seek an indictment of a 
corporation. Again, the ABA used claims of public interest to protect the interests of 
corporations, most of them large and publicly traded. And these efforts to paint the DOJ and 
agencies of the government as attacking the attorney-corporate client privilege did not begun 
until the Holder Memorandum was five years old, and the SEC’s Seaboard Report was three 
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years old. 
 
 It’s unclear whether Santayana’s famous saying, “Those who cannot remember the past 
are condemned to repeat it,” is true, for many historical events are not closely analogous to 
current crises. Hewing too closely to a reading of history leads one to prepare for the last war 
rather than the next one.  On the other hand, some events should be recent enough and close 
enough in time that Santayana’s aphorism leaps readily to mind. Peter Fishbein was the Kaye, 
Scholer lawyer misled by the owners of O.P.M. and left in the dark by O.P.M.’s previous 
lawyers, Singer Hutner, in the O.P.M. scandal at the beginning of the 1980s. At the end off the 
decade he represented Lincoln Savings & Loan and for his professional conduct in that matter 
was in 1992 permanently barred from representing federally insured financial institutions by the 
OTS.235 Shouldn’t he have remembered? Judge Stanley Sporkin asked in 1990, in considering 
the Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal, “Where were the professionals? ... Where also were the 
                                                 
235See Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis 
means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 639, 646 (1994), citing In re Fishbein,  
OTS AP-92 25 (March 11, 1992).  
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outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions were effectuated?”236 After his lament, 
Judge Sporkin concluded, “One of the great attributes of this nation is it learns from its 
mistakes.”237 Most Americans, optimists that they are, believe this will come to pass. Lawyers, 
either by training or inclination (or both), are less optimistic.  
                                                 
236Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).    
237Id. at 921. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TIMELINE OF EVENTS 
 
1997—ABA creates Special Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Ethics 2000 Commission) 
June 16, 1999—Holder memorandum released by Department of Justice 
March-April 2000-Dotcom bubble bursts, stock markets begin steep descent 
November 2000—First Ethics 2000 report issued 
June 2001—Final Report of Ethics 2000 issued; urges changes in Model Rule 1.6 on when client 
confidences may be disclosed, including permissible disclosure when client engaged in fraud 
August 6-7, 2001—ABA House of Delegates adopts some Ethics 2000 proposals; rejects 
amendment to Model Rule 1.6 relating to disclosure when client has created financial harm to 
third persons 
August 14, 2001—Jeffrey Skilling resigns as CEO of Enron 
August 28, 2001—Wall Street Journal article reports improprieties at Enron 
September 11, 2001—Attacks on World Trade Center, Pentagon and United 93 
October 16, 2001—Enron reports $600 million quarterly loss and loss of $1.2 billion in 
shareholder value due to Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) 
October 17, 2001—First Wall Street Journal report on multi-million dollar profit from SPEs by 
Enron CFO Andrew Fastow 
October 23, 2001—SEC issues Seaboard Report 
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November 8, 2001—Enron restates financials for past 5 years 
December 2, 2001—Enron files for bankruptcy 
January 2002—Congressional hearings begin 
January 28, 2002—Global Crossing files for bankruptcy 
February 4, 2002—ABA Midyear meeting adopts most remaining Model Rule amendments 
February 14, 2002—Republican Rep. Michael Oxley introduces bill to regulate accounting firms, 
and includes provision to study sufficiency of Model Rules as regulatory guide for lawyers 
March 14, 2002—Indictment of Arthur Andersen, accounting and consulting firm for Enron, 
publicly filed (indictment dated March 7) 
March 28, 2002—ABA creates Task Force on Corporate Responsibility 
April 2002—WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers resigns under pressure 
May 15, 2002—Adelphia CEO and Chairman of the Board John Rigas resigns under pressure 
June 2002—Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski resigns 
June 4, 2002—Kozlowski indicted by State of New York for tax avoidance 
June 12, 2002—Tyco announces SEC will open investigation of it 
June 15, 2002—Andersen convicted at trial (conviction reversed in Supreme Court, Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005))  
June 17, 2002—Tyco files civil suit against former Chief Corporate Counsel Mark Belnick 
June 25, 2002—WorldCom makes $3.8 billion restatement of EBITDA 
June 25, 2002—Adelphia files for chapter 11 
June 25, 2002—Sen. Sarbanes files bill that will become Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
July 9, 2002—President Bush issues executive order creating a Corporate Fraud Task Force in 
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the Department of Justice 
July 15, 2002—§ 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Edwards amendment) unanimously adopted by 
Senate, which requires SEC to create rules of lawyer regulation for those appearing before it 
July 16, 2002— Task Force on Corporate Responsibility issues preliminary report (later 
published at 58 Bus. Law. 145 (2002)) and suggests amendments to Model Rule 1.6 suggested 
by Ethics 2000 Committee be adopted, but made mandatory, not just permissible 
July 21, 2002—WorldCom files for bankruptcy, largest ever 
July 24, 2002—John Rigas and sons sued by SEC for fraud 
July 25, 2002—Sarbanes-Oxley adopted by Congress  
July 30, 2002—Sarbarnes-Oxley signed into law 
September 12, 2002—Kozlowski, former Tyco CFO Mark Swartz and former Tyco General 
Counsel Mark Belnick indicted (Belnick acquitted in July 2004) 
September 23, 2002—John Rigas and two sons indicted by federal government 
November 5, 2002—Harvey Pitt resigns as chairman of SEC 
November 21, 2002—SEC issues Proposed Rules regulating lawyer conduct; does not mandate 
disclosures due to “noisy withdrawal” requirment 
December 18, 2002—ABA offers comments on SEC Proposed Rules objecting to noisy 
withdrawal and other proposed rules 
January 20, 2003—Thompson Memorandum released 
January 23, 2003—Final rules of SEC pursuant to § 307 issued; SEC eliminates “noisy 
withdrawal” provision but keep disclosure of client confidences in fraud matters as discretionary 
not mandatory 
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March 31, 2003—Final Report of the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility issued; Report 
omits earlier decision to mandate disclosure and recommends ABA adopt amendments to Model 
Rule 1.6 to permit but not require disclosure 
August 2003—By vote of 218-201 ABA adopts proposed amendments to Model Rule 1.6 
Early 2004—Sentencing Commission proposes Commentary regarding effect of cooperation by 
waiving attorney-client privilege to sentencing guidelines 
Spring 2004—Trial of Tyco executives Swartz and Kozlowski (mistrial; retried and convicted in 
2005) 
August 2004—ABA House of Delegates resolves that waiver of attorney-client privilege and 
work product should not affect sentencing 
September 2004—ABA creates Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege 
November 2004—Sentencing Commission Commentary added regarding effect of waiver or 
non-waiver of attorney-client privilege 
August 2005—ABA adopts recommendations of Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege 
supporting Attorney-Client privilege 
April 5, 2006—Sentencing Commission votes to remove provision on waiver of privilege 
May 25, 2006—Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling convicted in federal court 
June 26, 2006—District court holds Thompson memorandum providing that payment of 
employee’s attorney fees would be considered lack of cooperation on part of employer, when 
consideration was being given to indicting employer, was violation of substantive due process 
rights of employees, and violated right to counsel, when government coerced KPMG into not 
paying attorney fees for accused, United States v. Stein, 435 F.Supp.2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
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August 2006—Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege issues final report with strong language 
attacking Thompson memorandum and actions of government in KPMG case 
September 12, 2006—Senate Judiciary Committee holds hearing on Thompson Memorandum 
November 1, 2006—Sentencing Guidelines commentary on waiver of privilege is removed 
November 7, 2006—off-year elections give control of both Houses of Congress to Democrats 
December 7, 2006 —“Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006,” informally introduced 
by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA), outgoing chairman of Senate Judiciary Committee  
December 12, 2006—DOJ issues McNulty memorandum, which replaces Thompson and Holder 
Memorandums 
January 4, 2007—Sen. Specter introduces Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act 
March 2007—Subcommittee of House Judiciary Committee holds hearing on McNulty 
Memorandum 
July 12, 2007—Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 introduced in House 
September 18, 2007—Senate Judiciary Committee holds hearing on Attorney-Client Privilege 
and McNulty Memorandum 
November 13, 2007—House adopts its version of Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 
2007 
June 27, 2008—Sen. Specter offers revised Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act bill 
